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Abstract
The standard notion of promise problem is a pair of disjoint sets of instances, each of which is
regarded as Yes and No instances, respectively, and the task of solving a promise problem is to
distinguish these two sets of instances. In this paper, we introduce a set of new promise problems
which are conjectured to be non-disjoint, and prove that hardness of these “non-disjoint” promise
problems gives rise to the existence of hitting set generators (and vice versa). We do this by presenting
a general principle which converts any black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator into
the existence of a hitting set generator whose security is based on hardness of some “non-disjoint”
promise problem (via a non-black-box security reduction).
Applying the principle to cryptographic pseudorandom generators, we introduce
The Gap(KSAT vs K) Problem: Given a string x and a parameter s, distinguish whether the
polynomial-time-bounded SAT-oracle Kolmogorov complexity of x is at most s, or the polynomial-
time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity of x (without SAT oracle) is at least s + O(log |x|).
If Gap(KSAT vs K) is NP-hard, then the worst-case and average-case complexity of PH is equivalent.
Under the plausible assumption that ENP 6= E, the promise problem is non-disjoint. These results
generalize the non-black-box worst-case to average-case reductions of Hirahara [31] and improve the
approximation error from Õ(
√
n) to O(log n).
Applying the principle to complexity-theoretic pseudorandom generators, we introduce a family of
Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems (MCLPs), which are problems of distinguishing
the truth tables of explicit functions from hard functions. Our results generalize the hardness versus
randomness framework and identify problems whose circuit lower bounds characterize the existence
of hitting set generators. For example, we introduce
The E vs SIZE(2o(n)) Problem: Given the truth table of a function f , distinguish whether f is
computable in exponential time or requires exponential-size circuits to compute.
A nearly-linear AC0 ◦ XOR circuit size lower bound for this promise problem is equivalent to the
existence of a logarithmic-seed-length hitting set generator for AC0 ◦ XOR. Under the plausible
assumption that E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)), the promise problem is non-disjoint (and thus the minimum
circuit size is infinity). This is the first result that provides the exact characterization of the
existence of a hitting set generator secure against C by the worst-case lower bound against C for
a circuit class C = AC0 ◦ XOR ⊆ TC0. In addition, we prove that a nearly-linear size lower bound
against co-nondeterministic read-once branching programs for some “non-disjoint” promise problem
is sufficient for resolving RL = L.
We also establish the equivalence between the existence of a derandomization algorithm for
uniform algorithms and a uniform lower bound for a problem of approximating Levin’s Kt-complexity.
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1 Introduction
A promise problem, introduced by Even, Selman, and Yacobi [18], is a pair of disjoint sets
(ΠYes,ΠNo) that are regarded as the sets of Yes and No instances, respectively. The problem
is regarded as a problem whose instances are “promised” to come from ΠYes∪ΠNo. Specifically,
an algorithm A is said to solve a promise problem (ΠYes,ΠNo) if A accepts any instance
x ∈ ΠYes and rejects any instance x ∈ ΠNo; the behavior of A on any “unpromised” instance
x 6∈ ΠYes ∪ΠNo can be arbitrary. The notion of promise problem is crucial for formalizing
several important concepts and theorems in complexity theory. A canonical example is the
unique satisfiability problem (1SAT,UNSAT), where 1SAT is the set of formulas that has a
unique satisfying assignment, and UNSAT is the set of unsatisfiable formulas. The promise
problem is a standard Promise-UP-complete problem, and the celebrated theorem of Valiant
and Vazirani [70] states that it is in fact NP-hard under randomized reductions. The reader
is referred to the survey of Goldreich [23] for more background on promise problems.
Usually, it is required that ΠYes and ΠNo are disjoint, i.e., ΠYes ∩ΠNo = ∅. The reason
is that if there exists an instance x ∈ ΠYes ∩ΠNo, then no algorithm can solve the promise
problem (ΠYes,ΠNo). Indeed, if there were an algorithm A that solves (ΠYes,ΠNo), then
A must accept x and simultaneously reject x, which is impossible. For this reason, every
definition of promise problems considered before is, to the best of our knowledge, always
disjoint.
In this paper, we introduce a set of new promise problems which are conjectured to be
non-disjoint. We will demonstrate that these “non-disjoint” promise problems are worth
investigating, by showing that hardness results for our promise problems have important
consequences in complexity theory. The fact that the promise problems are conjectured to be
non-disjoint means that solving promise problems are conjectured to be impossible, no matter
how long an algorithm is allowed to run. Surprisingly, our results show that if one can prove
mild hardness results of computing “non-disjoint” promise problems, which is conjectured to
be impossible, then one can resolve important open questions of complexity theory.
To be more specific, we consider open questions of whether there exists an explicit hitting
set generator. A hitting set generator (HSG) G = {Gn : {0, 1}s(n) → {0, 1}n}n∈N secure
against a class C of algorithms is a family of functions Gn such that any algorithm A ∈ C
that accepts at least a half of the n-bit strings must accept a string Gn(z) for some seed
z ∈ {0, 1}s(n) for all large n ∈ N. The existence of a secure hitting set generator makes it
possible to derandomize any one-sided-error C-randomized algorithm, by simply trying all
possible s(n)-bit seeds z and using G(z) as a source of randomness. A stronger notion called
a pseudorandom generator (PRG) enables us to derandomize two-sided-error randomized
algorithms.
1.1 Meta-Computational View of PRG Constructions
A standard approach for constructing pseudorandom generators is to use the hardness
versus randomness framework developed in, e.g., [72, 8, 53, 7, 38, 40, 63, 44]. One of the
landmark results of Impagliazzo and Wigderson [40] states that if there exists a function
in E = DTIME(2O(n)) that is not computable by a circuit of size 2αn for some constant
α > 0, then there exists a logarithmic-seed-length pseudorandom generator secure against
linear-size circuits (and, in particular, P = BPP follows). In general, such a result is proved by
using a black-box pseudorandom generator construction G(-) that converts any hard function
f 6∈ SIZE(2o(n)) to a pseudorandom generator Gf : {0, 1}O(n) → {0, 1}2αn secure against
circuits of size 2αn, where α > 0 is some constant.
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The underlying theme of this paper is to view black-box PRG constructions from a
meta-computational perspective. Usually, f is regarded as a fixed hard function such as
f 6∈ SIZE(2o(n)). Instead, here we regard f as an input to some “non-disjoint” promise problem,
and regard a black-box PRG construction G(-) as a reduction that proves the security of
some (universal) hitting set generator based on the hardness of the “non-disjoint” promise
problem. This new perspective can be applied to arbitrary black-box PRG constructions,
and it gives rise to a “non-disjoint” promise problem associated with the black-box PRG
construction. For example, the pseudorandom generator construction of [40] induces the
E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem, which is the problem of distinguishing whether f ∈ E/O(n) or
f 6∈ SIZE(2o(n)), given the truth table of a function f .
There are two types of a pseudorandom generator. One is a cryptographic PRG, which
is computable in polynomial time in its seed length. This notion is useful for building
secure cryptographic primitives. We present in Section 1.2 “non-disjoint” promise problems
whose hardness gives rise to a cryptographic hitting set generator. In particular, finding
a non-disjoint witness of the promise problem implies the average-case hardness of PH,
which provides a new approach for establishing the equivalence between the worst-case and
average-case complexity of PH. The other is a complexity-theoretic PRG, which is allowed
to be computed in time exponential in its seed length. This notion is sufficient for the
purpose of derandomizing randomized algorithms. In Section 1.3, we generalize the hardness
versus randomness framework by using the meta-computational view of black-box PRG
constructions, and establish the equivalence between circuit lower bounds for “non-disjoint”
promise problems and the existence of hitting set generators. Sections 1.2 and 1.3 can be
read independently.
1.2 Worst-Case versus Average-Case Complexity of PH
Understanding average-case complexity is a fundamental question in complexity theory.
Average-case hardness of NP is a prerequisite for building secure cryptographic primitives,
such as one-way functions and cryptographic pseudorandom generators. Indeed, it is not
hard to see that if there exists a polynomial-time-computable hitting set generator G, then
checking whether a given string is in the image of G is a problem in NP that is hard on
average (in the errorless sense). In this section, we present a new approach for proving the
average-case hardness of NP, by implicitly constructing a cryptographic hitting set generator.
A fundamental open question in the theory of average-case complexity, pioneered by [48],
is to establish the equivalence between the worst-case and average-case complexity of NP.
I Open Question 1. Does P 6= NP imply DistNP 6⊆ AvgP?
Here DistNP 6⊆ AvgP is an average-case analogue of NP 6= P. Open Question 1 asks whether
the worst-case hardness of NP implies that NP is hard on random instances generated
efficiently. The reader is referred to the survey of Bogdanov and Trevisan [9] for background
on average-case complexity.
For large enough complexity classes such as PSPACE and EXP, there is a general technique
for converting any worst-case hard function f to some two-sided-error average-case hard
function Enc(f) based on error-correcting codes [63, 66]. Here, the encoded function Enc(f)
is computable in PSPACE given oracle access to f ; thus, the worst-case and average-case
complexity of such large complexity classes are known to be equivalent. Viola [71] showed
limits of such an approach: Enc(f) cannot be computed in the polynomial-time hierarchy
PHf ; thus, the proof technique of using error-correcting codes is not sufficient to resolve
Open Question 1 as well as the following weaker open question:
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I Open Question 2. Does PH 6= P (or, equivalently, P 6= NP) imply DistPH 6⊆ AvgP?
Note that Open Question 2 is an easier question than Open Question 1, since PH = P is
known to be equivalent to NP = P.
There are significant obstacles for resolving Open Questions 1 and 2. One is the relativiz-
ation barrier due to Impagliazzo [39]. Another is the limits of black-box reductions due to
Feigenbaum and Fortnow [19] and Bogdanov and Trevisan [9].
Recently, a non-black-box worst-case to average-case reduction that is not subject to
the latter barrier was presented in [31]. The reduction shows that solving the problem
GapMINKT of approximating polynomial-time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity in the
worst-case sense can be reduced to solving MINKT on average. For an integer t ∈ N and
an oracle A, a t-time-bounded A-oracle Kolmogorov complexity Kt,A(x) of a finite string x
is defined as the shortest length of a program that prints x in t steps with oracle access to
A (see Section 2 for a precise definition). The promise problem GapMINKT = (ΠYes,ΠNo)
asks for approximating Kt(x) within an additive error of Õ(
√
Kt(x)), and is formally defined
as follows: ΠYes consists of (x, 1s, 1t) such that Kt(x) ≤ s; and ΠNo consists of (x, 1s, 1t)
such that Kpoly(|x|,t)(x) > s+ Õ(
√
s).
The result of [31] can be seen as providing an approach for establishing the equivalence
between worst-case and average-case complexity of NP; indeed, proving NP-hardness of
GapMINKT is sufficient for resolving Open Question 1. However, the approximation error
Õ(
√
s) caused by the reduction of [31] is not optimal, which makes the question of proving
NP-hardness of GapMINKT potentially harder.
1.2.1 Gap(KA vs K)
We herein introduce the following promise problem.
I Definition 3. For an oracle A and an approximation quality τ : N× N→ N, the problem
Gapτ (KA vs K) is defined as the following promise problem (ΠYes,ΠNo).
ΠYes := { (x, 1s, 1t) | Kt,A(x) ≤ s },
ΠNo := { (x, 1s, 1t) | Kτ(|x|,t)(x) > s+ log τ(|x|, t) }.
By default, we assume that τ is some polynomial and write Gap(KA vs K) ∈ P if there exists
some polynomial τ such that Gapτ (KA vs K) ∈ P.
In this paper, we prove
I Theorem 4. Let A be any oracle. If DistNPA ⊆ AvgP, then Gap(KA vs K) ∈ P.
An immediate corollary of Theorem 4 is an improvement of the reduction of [31], by
setting A := ∅. In particular, in order to resolve Open Question 1, it suffices to prove
NP-hardness of approximating Kt(x) within an additive error of log τ(|x|, t) given (x, 1t) as
input, for any polynomial τ . A key insight for reducing the approximation error is that
there are two main sources of the approximation error in the reduction of [31]: One comes
from fixing a random coin flip sequence, which we remove by using the pseudorandom
generator construction of Buhrman, Fortnow, and Pavan [11] under the assumption that
DistNP ⊆ AvgP. The other comes from the advice complexity of a black-box pseudorandom
generator construction, which we reduce by using a “k-wise direct product generator” whose
advice complexity is small [32].
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More surprisingly, the promise problem is conjectured to be non-disjoint for A := SAT.
That is, it is conjectured to be impossible for any algorithm to solve Gap(KSAT vs K)
– no matter how long the algorithm is allowed to run. Nevertheless, Theorem 4 shows
that under the assumption that PH is easy on average, there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm for solving Gap(KSAT vs K). Taking its contrapositive, this means that, in order to
resolve DistPH 6⊆ AvgP, it suffices to prove a super-polynomial time lower bound for solving
Gap(KSAT vs K), whose time complexity is conjectured to be infinity (in the sense that there
exists no algorithm that can compute the promise problem).
We now clarify why Gap(KSAT vs K) is conjectured to be non-disjoint. Under the plausible
assumption that ENP 6= E, it is not hard to see that there are infinitely many strings x such
that x is simultaneously a Yes and No instance; here, the string x is defined as the truth
table of the characteristic function of L ∈ ENP \ E/O(n) (see Proposition 24).
Another corollary of Theorem 4 is that under the assumption that DistPH ⊆ AvgP, any
string x that can be compressed with SAT oracle in polynomial time can be also compressed
without any oracle. Formally:
I Corollary 5. If DistPH ⊆ AvgP, then there exists a polynomial τ such that
Kτ(|x|,t)(x) ≤ Kt,SAT(x) + log τ(|x|, t)
for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and t ∈ N.
Proof. Under the assumption, Gap(KSAT vs K) can be solved by some algorithm. Thus
Gap(KSAT vs K) problem must be disjoint, from which the result follows immediately. J
Corollary 5 provides a new approach for resolving Open Question 2. In order to prove
DistPH 6⊆ AvgP under the assumption that P 6= NP, it suffices to find a string x that can
be compressed with SAT oracle but cannot be compressed without SAT oracle. In fact, it
suffices to find such a string x under the stronger assumption that NP 6⊆ P/poly. This is
because Pavan, Santhanam, and Vinodchandran [57] proved NP 6⊆ P/poly if Open Question 2
is negative.
More importantly, Theorem 4 suggests a more reasonable approach to Open Question 2.
Note that finding a string x compressible with SAT oracle but incompressible without any
oracle corresponds to proving the non-disjointness of Gap(KSAT vs K); this amounts to
proving the time complexity of solving Gap(KSAT vs K) is infinity. Theorem 4 suggests
that it suffices to prove that a polynomial-time algorithm cannot find a difference between
compressible strings under SAT oracle and incompressible strings without any oracle, under
the worst-case hardness assumption of NP. In particular, it suffices to prove NP-hardness of
Gap(KSAT vs K).
I Corollary 6 (A new approach for Open Question 2). Suppose that the Gap(KSAT vs K)
problem is “NP-hard under randomized reductions”1 in the sense that
NP 6⊆ BPP =⇒ Gap(KSAT vs K) 6∈ P.
Then, Open Question 2 is positive; that is,
DistPH 6⊆ AvgP ⇐⇒ PH 6= P.
1 Here we use the weak notion of “NP-hardness” in order to strengthen the result. Corollary 6 remains
true even if one interprets NP-hardness as a randomized reduction from NP.
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In a typical proof of NP-hardness of a disjoint promise problem Π = (ΠYes,ΠNo), one
needs to carefully design a reduction R from SAT to Π that “preserves” a structure of
SAT; i.e., any formula ϕ ∈ SAT is mapped to R(ϕ) ∈ ΠYes and any formula ϕ ∈ UNSAT is
mapped to R(ϕ) ∈ ΠNo. The task of proving NP-hardness of Gap(KSAT vs K) is potentially
much easier, because it suffices to find a reduction R that may not preserve a structure
of SAT; in principle, R(ϕ) can be a fixed input x that is in the intersection of Yes and
No instances of Gap(KSAT vs K) . It is worth mentioning that proving NP-hardness of
Gap(KSAT vs K) is easier than proving NP-hardness of GapMINKT since GapMINKT is
reducible to Gap(KSAT vs K) via an identity map.
1.2.2 Non-NP-Hardness Results Do Not Apply
A line of work presented evidence that NP-hardness of MINKT is not likely to be established
under deterministic reductions (e.g., [45, 51, 36, 35]). For example, it is not hard to see that
the proof technique of Murray and Williams [51] (who proved a similar result for MCSP)
can be extended to the case of GapMINKT.
I Theorem 7 (Essentially in [51]; cf. [32]). If GapMINKT is NP-hard under many-one
deterministic reductions, then EXP 6= ZPP.
This result suggests that establishing NP-hardness of GapMINKT under deterministic reduc-
tions is a challenging task. In contrast, we observe that a similar “non-NP-hardness” result
cannot be applied to a non-disjoint promise problem.
I Proposition 8. Assume that NP-hardness of Gap(KSAT vs K) under many-one reductions
implies EXP 6= ZPP. Then, EXP 6= ZPP holds unconditionally.
The reason is that Gap(KSAT vs K) is well defined only if EXP 6= ZPP. More formally:
Proof. There are two cases. Either Gap(KSAT vs K) is disjoint or not disjoint. In the former
case, by Proposition 24, we have ENP = E; thus EXP = EXPNP = ZPEXP 6= ZPP. In the
latter case, there exists a string x that is simultaneously a Yes and No instance. A reduction
that always maps to x defines a many-one reduction from any problem to Gap(KSAT vs K);
thus, EXP 6= ZPP follows from the assumption. J
In light of Proposition 8, we leave as an interesting open question whether there is any
barrier explaining the difficulty of proving NP-hardness of the non-disjoint promise problem.
We mention that GapMINKTSAT, which is equivalent to Gap(KSAT vs KSAT), is known to be
DistNP-hard [32]. In particular, since Gap(KSAT vs KSAT) is reducible to Gap(KSAT vs K)
via an identity map, the latter is also DistNP-hard. Therefore, in order to present a barrier
for proving NP-hardness of Gap(KSAT vs K), one must exploit a property that holds for NP
but does not hold for DistNP (unless the notion of reducibility is strong).
1.2.3 Gap(F vs F−1): Meta-Computational View of HILL’s PRG
We also propose another approach towards Open Question 1, by introducing a promise
problem which asks for distinguishing whether a given function is computable by small
circuits, or cannot be inverted by small circuits. Specifically, for an approximation quality τ ,
we define the promise problem Gapτ (F vs F−1) as follows. Given a size parameter s ∈ N
and an integer n ∈ N and random access to a function F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, the task is to
distinguish the following two cases:
Yes: F is computable by a circuit of size s.
No: F cannot be inverted on average by any F -oracle circuit of size τ(n, s).
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We show that “NP-hardness” of Gapτ (F vs F−1) for every polynomial τ is enough for
resolving Open Question 1. More specifically, we prove
I Theorem 9. If DistNP ⊆ AvgP, then there exist a polynomial τ and a coRP-type randomized
algorithm that solves Gapτ (F vs F−1) on input (n, s) in time poly(n, s). In particular, Open
Question 1 is true if Gapτ (F vs F−1) is “NP-hard” for every polynomial τ in the following
sense: NP ⊆ BPP follows from the assumption that Gapτ (F vs F−1) admits a coRP-type
algorithm.
This is proved by viewing the black-box PRG construction based on any one-way function,
which is given by Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [29], from the meta-computational
perspective.
It is easy to observe that Gap(F vs F−1) is non-disjoint under the existence of a one-
way function, which is one of the most standard cryptographic primitives. Thus, it is
widely believed that Gap(F vs F−1) is impossible to solve. Nevertheless, NP-hardness of
Gap(F vs F−1) is sufficient for resolving Open Question 1.
1.3 Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems; MCLPs
We now turn our attention to complexity-theoretic hitting set generators. A standard approach
for constructing complexity-theoretic pseudorandom generators is to use the hardness versus
randomness framework, which reduces the task of constructing a pseudorandom generator to
the task of finding an explicit hard function, such as f ∈ E \ SIZE(2o(n)).
It is, however, a widely accepted fact that proving a circuit size lower bound for an
explicit function is extremely hard. Here by an explicit function, we mean that a function is
computable in E = DTIME(2O(n)). It is an open question whether there exists an exponential-
time-computable function f ∈ E that cannot be computed by any circuit of size 4n (cf. [20]).
On the other hand, a simple counting argument shows that most functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
cannot be computed by circuits of size 2αn for any constant α < 1.
Why is it so difficult to prove a circuit lower bound for an explicit function? We propose
to view this question from a meta-computational perspective. The fact that it is difficult
for human beings to show that an explicit function cannot be computed by small circuits
suggests that it should be also difficult for algorithms to analyze a circuit lower bound. Our
results indicate that if we can make this intuition formal, then we get breakthrough results
in complexity theory.
Specifically, we herein introduce a family of new computational problems, which we
call Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems (MCLPs). These problems ask for
distinguishing the truth table of explicit functions from hard functions. For example, we
propose the following promise problem:
The E vs SIZE(2o(n)) Problem (informal)
Given the truth table of a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, distinguish whether f ∈ E/O(n)
or f 6∈ SIZE(2o(n)).
Before defining the problem formally, let us first observe that the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem
is closely related to the open question of whether E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)). Indeed, it is not hard
to show that E/O(n) 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)) if and only if E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)) by regarding an advice
string as a part of input. Therefore, the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is non-disjoint under the
standard circuit lower bound assumption that E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)).
We now define the problem formally. According to the standard notion of advice [42],
the complexity class E/O(n) is defined as a subset of functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} that are
defined on all the strings of any length. Thus, “f ∈ E/O(n)” does not make sense for a
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function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Instead, we interpret advice by using the notion of Levin’s
resource-bounded Kolmogorov complexity [47] so that the notion of advice is meaningful
for a finite function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, let Kt(x) denote the
Kt-complexity of a string x, which is defined as the minimum of |M | + log t over all the
programs M that output x in time t; here, |M | denotes the description length of M . The
E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is formally defined as follows.
I Definition 10. For any functions t, s : N → N, let (ΠYes(t(n)),ΠNo(s(n))) denote the
promise problem defined as
ΠtYes := { f ∈ {0, 1}2
n
| Kt(f) ≤ log t(n), n ∈ N },
ΠsNo := { f ∈ {0, 1}2
n
| size(f) > s(n), n ∈ N }.
Here, we identity a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} with its truth table representation f ∈
{0, 1}2n , and size(f) denotes the minimum size of a circuit that computes f .
The E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is defined as the family {(ΠYes(2cn),ΠNo(2αn))}c,α>0 of
the promise problems. A family {Π} of problems is said to be solved by a class C and denoted
by {Π} ∈ C if every problem in the family is solved by some algorithm in C.
The idea behind Definition 10 is that the complexity class E/O(n) can be characterized
as the class of the functions f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}}n∈N such that, for some constant c,
for all large n ∈ N, Kt(fn) ≤ cn holds. Indeed, f ∈ E/O(n) means that the truth table of fn
can be described by a Turing machine of description length O(n) in time 2O(n) for all large n.
The relationship between complexity classes with advice and resource-bounded Kolmogorov
complexity will be explained in detail in Section 4.2, where we interpret “DTIME(t(n))/a(n)”
as a subset of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}.
1.3.1 Meta-Computational View of the Hardness vs Randomness
Framework
We show that a nearly-linear-size AC0 ◦ XOR circuit size lower bound for solving the E vs
SIZE(2o(n)) problem exactly characterizes the existence of a hitting set generator secure
against AC0 ◦ XOR.
I Theorem 11. The following (Items 1 to 4) are equivalent.
1. There exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in
time nO(1) and secure against linear-size AC0 ◦ XOR circuits.
2. For all large N ∈ N, there exists no AC0 ◦ XOR circuit of size N1+o(1) that computes the
E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem, where N = 2n denotes the input length.
The condition can be equivalently stated without referring to the “non-disjoint” promise prob-
lem. Let MKtP[O(logN),No(1)] denote the family of the promise problems MKtP[c logN,Nα]
for constants c, α > 0, where, for functions s, t : N→ N, MKtP[s(N), t(N)] denotes the prom-
ise problem of distinguishing strings x such that Kt(x) ≤ s(|x|) and strings x such that
Kt(x) > t(|x|). Then, the following are equivalent as well.
3. For all large N ∈ N, there exists no AC0 ◦ XOR circuit of size N1+o(1) that computes
MKtP[O(logN), No(1)].
4. For any constant k ∈ N, for all large N ∈ N, there exists no AC0 ◦ XOR circuit of size
Nk that computes MKtP[O(logN), No(1)].
Observe that Item 1 of Theorem 11 implies a strongly exponential AC0 circuit lower bound
for E, which also implies that EXP 6⊆ NC1 (see, e.g., [3, 55, 26]). These are long-standing
open questions with the state of the art being Håstad’s lower bounds [28]. Theorem 11
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shows that, in order to improve the state-of-the-art lower bound, it is sufficient to prove
a nearly-linear AC0 ◦ XOR lower bound for the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem. In contrast, the
minimum circuit for computing the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is infinity under the standard
circuit lower bound assumption that E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)).
It is instructive to compare our results with the hardness versus randomness framework.
In order to obtain a hitting set generator in the latter framework, we need to find an explicit
function that is hard for small circuits to compute. In our framework, finding an explicit
hard function corresponds to proving that the minimum circuit size for computing MCLPs is
infinity (or, in other words, proving that there exists no circuit of any size that computes
MCLPs2). Our results significantly weaken the assumption needed to obtain a hitting set
generator: It suffices to show that a nearly-linear circuit cannot find the difference between
an explicit function and a hard function.
Our results can be also stated based on the case analysis. There are two cases. (1)
When the circuit lower bound that E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)) holds, the work of [40] already implies
the existence of a pseudorandom generator. (2) Even if the circuit lower bound does fail,
Theorem 11 shows that a very modest lower bound for the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem (which
is a disjoint promise problem under the assumption) implies the existence of a hitting set
generator. In either case, we obtain a hitting set generator. Our results generalize the
hardness versus randomness framework in this sense.
Previously, based on the hardness versus randomness framework, it is known that E 6⊆ C
is equivalent to the existence of a pseudorandom generator secure against C for a sufficiently
large class C (see, e.g., [22]). However, in the previous approach, one needs to transform a
worst-case C-circuit lower bound to an average-case C-circuit lower bound; thus C needs to
be a sufficiently large so that it can perform local decoding, which requires the majority gate
[61]. For any circuit class C smaller than TC0, it was not clear whether the existence of a
hitting set generator secure against C is equivalent to some worst-case C-circuit lower bound.
Theorem 11 establishes the first equivalence for the circuit class C = AC0 ◦ XOR, which is
smaller than TC0 [59].
Our results can be stated without the non-standard notion of promise problem,
as in Items 3 and 4 of Theorem 11. Indeed, any promise problem in the family
MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] asks for approximating the Kt-complexity of a given string, and
it is always a disjoint promise problem. In our terminology, MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] is equival-
ent to the E vs DTIME(22o(n))/2o(n) problem. Since SIZE(2o(n)) ⊆ DTIME(22o(n))/2o(n), one
can observe that the E vs DTIME(22o(n))/2o(n) problem is reducible to the E vs SIZE(2o(n))
problem via an identity map, which explains the implication from Item 3 to Item 2 in
Theorem 11.
We mention in passing that it is not hard to prove an AC0 lower bound for
MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] (i.e., without the bottom XOR gates) by using the pseudorandom
restriction method as in [34, 17, 14]. (See Appendix B for a proof.)
I Proposition 12. For any constants α < 1, k, d ∈ N, there exists a constant c such that
MKtP[c logN,Nα] 6∈ i.o.AC0d(Nk).
2 This should be compared with the fact that any disjoint promise problem can be computed by a circuit
of size O(2n/n) on inputs of length n.
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For any classes C,D of functions, one can define the C vs D problem. A particularly
interesting problem is the E vs ÃC0(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) problem, where D̃(s; δ) denotes the
class of functions that can be computed by a D-circuit of size s on at least a (1 − δ)
fraction of inputs. We prove that, if nearly-linear-size AC0 circuits cannot distinguish an
explicit function from a function that cannot be approximated by small AC0 circuits, then
a logarithmic-seed-length hitting set generator can be obtained. (Moreover, the converse
direction is easy to prove.)
I Theorem 13. The following are equivalent.
1. The E vs ÃC0(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) problem cannot be computed by AC0 circuits of size
N1+o(1) for all large N = 2n.
2. There exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in
time nO(1) and secure against linear-size AC0 circuits.
3. MKtP[O(logN), N − 1] 6∈ i.o.AC0(N1+β) for some constant β > 0.
4. MKtP[O(logN), N − 1] 6∈ i.o.AC0(Nk) for any constant k.
An interesting aspect of Theorem 13 is its self-referential nature; intuitively, Item 1
means that AC0 circuits cannot analyze AC0 circuits itself. Note that self-reference is crucial
for proving, e.g., time hierarchy theorems for uniform computational models. Theorem 13
provides an analogue in a non-uniform circuit model.
Why do we consider “non-disjoint” promise problems, despite the fact that Theorems 11
and 13 can be stated by using only the standard notions?3 First, Theorem 11 is obtained by
viewing (a variant of) the black-box PRG construction of Impagliazzo and Wigderson [40]
from a meta-computational perspective; thus, it is natural to state Theorem 11 as a connection
between the existence of a hitting set generator and a lower bound for the E vs SIZE(2o(n))
problem. Second, an identity map reduces MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] to the E vs SIZE(2o(n))
problem, and thus it is easier to prove a lower bound for the latter problem. Third, the known
worst-case-and-average-case equivalence between E ⊆ SIZE(2o(n)) and E ⊆ S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 −
2−o(n)) [63] can be naturally regarded as a reduction from the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem
to the E vs S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) problem. Indeed, Theorem 13 is proved by viewing the
Nisan–Wigderson pseudorandom generator from a meta-computational perspective, and
then Theorem 13 is translated into Theorem 11 by using the worst-case-and-average-case
equivalence.
We also present a potential approach for resolving the RL = L question. Here, RL
is the complexity class of languages that can be solved by a one-sided-error randomized
O(logn)-space Turing machine that reads its random tape only once. A canonical approach
for proving RL = L is to construct a log-space-computable hitting set generator of seed length
O(logn) secure against O(n)-size read-once branching programs. A state-of-the-art result
is the pseudorandom generator of seed length O(log2 n) given by Nisan [52] for read-once
(known-order) oblivious branching programs, and the pseudorandom generator of seed length
O(log3 n) given by Forbes and Kelley [21] for read-once unknown-order oblivious branching
programs.4
3 We also mention that the non-disjointness itself can provide new consequences, such as Corollaries 5
and 16.
4 In the area of unconditional derandomization of space-bounded randomized algorithms, it is common to
assume that a branching program is oblivious and reads the input in the fixed order. Here, we do not
assume these properties.
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We show that a hitting set generator of seed length O(logn) can be constructed if
nearly-linear-size read-once co-nondeterministic branching programs cannot distinguish
linear-space-computable functions from hard functions.
ITheorem 62. Suppose that there exist some constants α, β > 0 such that the DSPACE(n) vs
S̃IZE(2O(αn); 2−αn) problem cannot be computed by read-once co-nondeterministic branching
programs of size N1+β for all large input lengths N = 2n ∈ N. Then there exists a hitting set
generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in O(logn) space and secure
against linear-size read-once branching programs (and, in particular, RL = L follows).
Theorem 62 can be compared with the result of Klivans and van Melkebeek [44], which
shows the existence of a pseudorandom generator secure against branching programs under
the assumption that DSPACE(n) requires a circuit of size 2Ω(n). Under the same assumption,
by using a worst-case-to-average-case reduction for DSPACE(n), it can be shown that the
DSPACE(n) vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ) problem is non-disjoint for any sufficiently small δ ≥ 0 (cf.
Proposition 43). In this case, the minimum size of a co-nondeterministic branching program
for computing the MCLP is infinity; thus, Theorem 62 generalizes the result of [44].
It should be noted that limits of the computational power of read-once non-deterministic
branching programs are well understood. For example, Borodin, Razborov, and Smolensky [10]
presented an explicit function that cannot be computed by any read-k-times nondeterministic
branching program of size 2o(n) for any constant k. Theorem 62 shows that, in order to resolve
RL = L, it suffices to similarly analyze the read-once co-nondeterministic branching program
size lower bound for computing the MCLP. This approach could be useful; by using the
Nechiporuck method, it can be shown that neither nondeterministic nor co-nondeterministic
branching programs of size o(N1.5/ logN) can compute MKtP [16], which is a much more
general lower bound than read-k-times nondeterministic branching programs.
We also mention that a partial converse of Theorem 62 is easy to prove: If there exists a log-
space-computable hitting set generator secure against linear-size read-once nondeterministic
branching programs, then the DSPACE(n) vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ) problem cannot be computed by
a read-once co-nondeterministic branching programs of size Nk, where N = 2n and k is
an arbitrary constant. More generally, any results showing the existence of a hitting set
generator secure against C must entail a coC-lower bound for MCLPs (cf. Proposition 54).
1.3.2 Non-trivial Derandomization and Lower Bounds for MKtP
Our proof techniques can be also applied to uniform algorithms. We consider the question
of whether one-sided-error uniform algorithms can be non-trivially derandomized in time
2n−ω(
√
n logn). We say that an algorithm A is a derandomization algorithm for DTIME(t(n))
if, for any machine M running in time t(n), A takes 1n and a description of M as in-
put and outputs y ∈ {0, 1}n such that M(y) = 1 for infinitely many n ∈ N such that
Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x) = 1] ≥ 12 . Unlike the standard notion of derandomization algorithm for
non-uniform computational models, the description length of M is at most a constant; thus,
our notion of derandomization algorithm is essentially equivalent to the existence of a hitting
set generator secure against DTIME(t(n)). Applying our proof techniques to this setting, we
establish the following equivalence between the existence of a derandomization algorithm for
uniform algorithms and a lower bound for approximating Kt complexity.
I Theorem 14. For any constant 0 < ε < 1, the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a derandomization algorithm for DTIME(2O(
√




2. MKtP[N − ω(
√
N logN), N − 1] 6∈ DTIME(2O(
√
N logN)).
3. MKtP[N ε, N ε + ω(
√
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Usually, the time complexity is measured with respect to the input size. Our result,
however, suggests that the time complexity of MKtP[s(N), s(N) + ω̃(
√
N)] is well captured
by the size parameter s(N) rather than the input size N : Indeed, Theorem 14 implies that
MKtP[N ε, N ε + ω(
√




MKtP[Nδ, Nδ + ω(
√
Nδ logN)] ∈ DTIME(2O(
√
Nδ logN))
for any 0 < ε, δ < 1.
Theorem 14 highlights the importance of a lower bound for MKtP. In fact, it is a long-
standing open question whether MKtP 6∈ P, despite the fact that MKtP is an EXP-complete
problem under non-uniform reductions [2]. Towards resolving the open question, we show
that some promise problem can be solved in coRP under the assumption that MKtP ∈ P.
I Theorem 15. Assume that MKtP ∈ P. Then, there exists a coRP-algorithm that solves
the Kt vs Kt problem, which is defined as follows: Given a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ of length n
and a parameter s ∈ N, distinguish whether Kt(x) ≤ s or Kt(x) ≥ s+O(
√
s logn+ log2 n),
where t = poly(n).
Using the disjointness of the Kt vs Kt problem and setting s := Kt(x), we obtain
I Corollary 16. If MKtP ∈ P, then Kt(x) ≤ Kt(x) + O(
√
Kt(x) logn + log2 n) for any
x ∈ {0, 1}n and any t ≥ poly(n).
Since Kt(x) ≤ Kpoly(n)(x) +O(logn) holds unconditionally, Corollary 16 shows that Kt(x)
and Kpoly(n)(x) are close to each other under the assumption that MKtP ∈ P. We mention
that the problem of computing Kt(n)(x) given x ∈ {0, 1}n cannot be computed in polynomial
time when t(n) = nω(1) [32].
1.3.3 Related Work: Minimum Circuit Size Problem
The definitions of MCLPs are inspired by the Minimum Circuit Size Problem (MCSP). While
the history of MCSP is said to date back to as early as 1950s [64], its importance was not
widely recognized until Kabanets and Cai [41] named the problem as MCSP and investigated
it based on the natural proof framework of Razborov and Rudich [60]. The task of MCSP is
to decide whether there exists a size-s circuit that computes f , given the truth table of a
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and a size parameter s ∈ N. It turned out that MCSP is one of
the central computational problems in relation to wide research areas of complexity theory,
including circuit lower bounds [60], learning theory [13], and cryptography [60, 2, 4, 31].
Over the last twenty years of the study of MCSP, it has been recognized that MCSP
lacks one desirable mathematical property – monotonicity with respect to an underlying
computational model. MCSP can be defined for any circuit classes C; for example, C-MCSP
stands for a version of MCSP where the task is to find the minimum C-circuit size; MCSPA
stands for the minimum A-oracle circuit size problem. We are tempted to conjecture
that, as a computational model becomes stronger, the corresponding minimization problem
becomes harder; e.g., MCSPA should be harder than MCSP for any oracle A. However,
this is not the case – Hirahara and Watanabe [35] showed that there exists an oracle
A such that MCSP 6≤pT MCSP
A unless MCSP ∈ P. Moreover, DNF-MCSP [49, 3] and
(DNF ◦XOR)-MCSP [33] are known to be NP-complete, whereas NP-completeness of MCSP
is a long-standing open question.
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Why does the monotonicity of MCSP fail? C-MCSP can be regarded as a special case of
the C vs D problem where C = D. It is easy to observe that the C vs D problem is reducible
to the C′ vs D′ problem via an identity map if C ⊆ C′ and D ⊇ D′; thus, MCLPs have
monotonicity properties in this sense. In contrast, the monotonicity property of MCLPs fails
when C = D ⊆ C′ = D′, which corresponds to the case of MCSP.
In an attempt to remedy the monotonicity issue, Hirahara and Santhanam [34] observed
that average-case complexity of MCSP is monotone increasing. Carmosino, Impagliazzo,
Kabanets, and Kolokolova [13] implicitly showed that the complexity of MCSP is monotone
increasing under non-black-box reductions.
In contrast, MCLPs incorporate the monotonicity property in the definition itself, which
makes a mathematical theory cleaner. For example, recall that it can be shown that
E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)) if and only if E 6⊆ S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) by using error-correcting codes [63].
Viewing this equivalence from a meta-computational perspective, it can be interpreted as
an efficient reduction from the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem to the E vs S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n))
problem (cf. Theorem 59). A similar reduction was proved for MCSP under the assumption
that EXP ⊆ P/poly [14]; finding such a reduction for MCSP requires certain creativity,
whereas working with the definition of MCLPs makes it trivial to find the reduction.
1.3.4 Related Work: Hardness Magnification
A recent line of work [55, 54, 50, 15, 14] exhibit surprising phenomena, which are termed
as “hardness magnification phenomena.” Oliveira, Santhanam, and Pich [55, 54] showed
that very weak lower bounds for MCSP and related problems are sufficient for resolving
long-standing open questions about circuit lower bounds, such as EXP 6⊆ NC1. A surprising
aspect of hardness magnification phenomena is that, as argued in [6, 55], the argument does
not seem to be subject to the natural proof barrier of Razborov and Rudich [60], which is
one of the major obstacles of complexity theory. Our results provide an interpretation of
hardness magnification phenomena from the perspective of a construction of a hitting set
generator.
It is worthwhile to point out that our reductions have very similar structures to hardness
magnification phenomena. For example, it was shown in [55, 54] that, for a parameter
s = s(N), the problem MKtP[s, s+O(logN)] can be solved by an ANDO(N) ◦Dpoly(s) ◦XOR
circuit, whereDpoly(s) is an oracle gate computable in EXP that takes an input of length poly(s).
This reduction shows that EXP ⊆ P/poly implies MKtP[s, s+O(logN)] ∈ SIZE(N · poly(s)).
Taking its contrapositive, it can be interpreted as a hardness magnification phenomenon: for
s(N) N , a (seemingly) weak lower bound MKtP[s, s+O(logN)] 6∈ SIZE(N · poly(s)) can
be “hardness magnified” to a strong circuit lower bound EXP 6⊆ P/poly.
Theorem 61 has exactly the same structure with the reduction mentioned above. Given a
circuit D that avoids a hitting set generator, we construct a nearly-linear-size ANDO(N) ◦
D ◦ XOR circuit that computes the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem. Thus, our reductions are as
efficient as the reductions presented in the line of work of hardness magnification phenomena.
More importantly, our results significantly strengthen the consequences of hardness
magnification: Not only circuit lower bounds, but also hitting set generators can be obtained.
This is especially significant for the case of read-once branching programs. Since there is
already an exponential size lower bound for read-once branching programs [10], it does not
make sense to try to hardness-magnify a lower bound for read-once branching programs.
In contrast, our results (Theorem 62) indicate that a nearly-linear lower bound for co-
nondeterministic read-once branching programs is enough for resolving RL = L.
CCC 2020
20:14 Meta-Computational View of PRG Constructions
An intriguing question about hardness magnification is this: By using hardness magni-
fication phenomena, can we prove any new consequences, such as circuit lower bounds or
derandomization? Theorem 62 adds a new computational model, i.e., co-nondeterministic
read-once branching programs, for exploring this question.
Chen, Hirahara, Oliveira, Pich, Rajgopal, and Santhanam [14] proposed a barrier for
the question, termed as a “locality barrier.” Briefly speaking, the idea there is to regard
hardness magnification phenomena as a (black-box) reduction to oracles with small fan-in,
and then to show that most circuit lower bound proofs can be extended to rule out such
a reduction; thus, such a circuit lower bound proof technique cannot be combined with
hardness magnification phenomena. A salient feature of our reductions is that our reductions
are non-black-box in the sense that we exploit the efficiency of oracles; the non-black-box
property appears in the definition of No instances of the C vs D problem. Therefore, our
results provide a potential approach for bypassing the locality barrier: Try to develop a
circuit lower bound proof technique that crucially exploits the structure of the No instances
of the C vs D problem. The existing circuit lower bound proof techniques for MCSP and
related problems fail to exploit such a structure.
1.4 Proof Techniques: Meta-Computational View of PRG
Constructions
All of our results are given by a single principle – that views any black-box pseudorandom
generator construction from a meta-computational perspective. The differences among our
theorems simply originate from the fact that we use a different black-box pseudorandom
generator construction. The underlying principle is this:
Any black-box construction of a pseudorandom generator Gf based on a hard function
f 6∈ R gives rise to a non-black-box security reduction for a hitting set generator
based on the hardness of a non-disjoint promise problem (e.g., the E vs R problem).
For the purpose of exposition, we take a specific PRG construction of Impagliazzo and
Wigderson [40], and explain the connection between the PRG construction and the E vs
SIZE(2o(n)) problem. The theorem of [40] states that E 6⊆ i.o.SIZE(2o(n)) implies the existence
of a pseudorandom generator. The PRG construction is a black-box pseudorandom generator
construction Gf based on a hard function f 6∈ SIZE(2o(n)) in the following sense.
Explicitness.Gf (z) is computable in polynomial time given the truth table of f and a seed z.
Security. If there exists a function D that distinguishes the output distribution of Gf (-)
from the uniform distribution, then f ∈ SIZED(2o(n)).
Here, by “black-box”, we mean that the security of the PRG is proved by a (black-box)
reduction, i.e., the security reduction works for every function D. In contrast, we say that a
reduction is non-black-box if the reduction may not be correct when an oracle is inefficient.
This is in the same spirit with the non-black-box reduction of [31], which overcomes the
black-box reduction barrier of Bogdanov and Trevisan [9]. We explain below how a black-box
PRG construction gives rise to a non-black-box security reduction of a hitting set generator.
The goal is to construct some secure hitting set generator H = {Hm : {0, 1}O(logm) →
{0, 1}m}m∈N. As a choice of H, we simply take a “universal” hitting set generator: Let U be
a universal Turing machine, i.e., a machine that simulates every Turing machine efficiently.
Then we define Hm(z) to be the output of U on input z if U halts in 2|z| steps, where
z ∈ {0, 1}O(logm). The choice of H is universal, in the sense that the existence of some
exponential-time computable HSG implies that H is also secure.
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The strategy for proving the security of a hitting set generator H is to regard f as an
input of the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem, and to view the black-box PRG construction Gf as a
(non-black-box) reduction from the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem to the task of avoiding H.
We claim that H is a hitting set generator secure against linear-size circuits, under the
assumption that the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem cannot be solved by small circuits. To this
end, we present a reduction from the task of solving the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem to the
task of “avoiding” H. That is, if H is not secure, then there exists a linear-size circuit D
that avoids H, i.e., every image of H is rejected by D whereas D accepts at least a half of
all inputs. A randomized reduction R for solving the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is extremely
simple:
A randomized algorithm R for solving the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem with D oracle
Given f as an input, pick a random seed z of Gf , and accept if and only if D(Gf (z)) = 0.
The correctness of the reduction R can be proved as follows. Assume that f is a Yes
instance of the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem; in other words, this means that Kt(f) ≤ O(log |f |) =
O(n). Since Gf is efficiently computable, it follows that Kt(Gf (z)) ≤ O(n) for every seed
z ∈ {0, 1}O(n). By using the property of the universal hitting set generator Hm and choosing
m large enough, it can be observed that Gf (z) is in the image of Hm; thus Gf (z) is rejected
by D.
Conversely, we prove that any No instance of the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem is rejected
by the algorithm R with high probability. Intuitively, this is because of the fact that if f
is a hard function, then D cannot distinguish Gf (-) from the uniform distribution. More
formally, we claim the contrapositive. Assume that D rejects Gf (z) with high probability,
say, at least 34 . This means that
Pr
z
[D(Gf (z)) = 1] ≤ 14 .
On the other hand, sinceD avoidsH, we have Prw[D(w) = 1] ≥ 12 . Therefore, D distinguishes
the distribution of Gf from the uniform distribution with advantage 14 ; by the black-box
security proof of Gf , we obtain that f ∈ SIZED(2o(n)). Since D is a linear-size circuit,
we conclude that f ∈ SIZE(2o(n)), which means that f is not a No instance of the E vs
SIZE(2o(n)) problem. Note here that we rely on the efficiency of D, which makes the security
proof of the HSG H non-black-box.
We conclude that there exists a randomized circuit for computing the E vs SIZE(2o(n))
problem. By using a standard trick of Adleman [1], the randomness of the circuit can be
fixed, and obtain a deterministic circuit that computes the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem.
Note that the proof above shows a generic connection between a black-box pseudorandom
generator construction and a “non-disjoint” promise problem. The efficiency of the security
reduction depends on the choice of a black-box PRG construction. In the rest of this paper,
we present some of the instantiations of the proof ideas above based on several specific
constructions of PRGs; however, we emphasize that our reductions are not limited to those
specific instantiations, and new black-box PRG constructions can lead to a more efficient
reduction and a “non-disjoint” promise problem that is easy to analyze.
1.5 Perspective: Meta-Computational View of Complexity Theory
More broadly, we propose to view complexity theory from a meta-computational perspective.
In order to explain the view, it is helpful to regard an algorithm that tries to solve MCLPs
as a malicious prover that tries to falsify a circuit lower bound. To be more specific, consider
the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem. As we explained earlier, the existence of any algorithm (of
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any complexity) that solves the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem implies that E ⊆ SIZE(2o(n)), and
moreover the converse direction is also true. In this sense, any algorithm that solves an MCLP
can be regarded as an adversary that falsifies circuit lower bounds such as E 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)).
Complexity theory can be regarded as a game between us (i.e., complexity theorists, who
try to prove circuit lower bounds) and provers (i.e., algorithms that solve MCLPs). We lose
the game if some prover can solve MCLPs (and hence circuit lower bounds fail). We win
the game if we find an explicit function whose circuit complexity is high. This is equivalent
to finding a witness for the non-disjointness of the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem, and thus it is
equivalent to showing that there exists no prover that can solve the MCLP. In other words,
prior to our work, we implicitly tried to fight against every prover without any restriction on
efficiency.
What we showed in this work is that we do not have to fight against every non-efficient
prover. Instead, in order to obtain a circuit lower bound (which is implied by the existence
of a hitting set generator), it suffices to show that no efficient algorithms such as nearly-
linear-size AC0 ◦ XOR circuits can find the difference between explicit functions and hard
functions. In principle, it should be easier to prove a nearly-linear circuit size lower bound
for some problem when we believe that the problem does not admit any algorithm (because
of the non-disjointness). While we have not found any existing method for proving such a
lower bound that is sufficient for breakthrough results, we believe that this is simply because
of the fact that MCLPs were not investigated explicitly. We leave as an important open
question to develop a proof technique to analyze MCLPs.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For a Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, we denote by tt(f) the truth table of f , i.e.,
the concatenation of f(x) for all x ∈ {0, 1}n in the lexicographical order. Conversely, for
a string y ∈ {0, 1}N , the function fn(y) : {0, 1}dlogNe → {0, 1} is defined as fn(y)(i) :=
(the ith bit of y) if i ≤ N and fn(y)(i) := 0 otherwise, where i ∈ [2dlogNe] is identified with
a binary representation in {0, 1}dlogNe. For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, we denote by size(x) the
minimum circuit size for computing the Boolean function fn(x) : {0, 1}dlog |x|e → {0, 1}. We
often identify a string x with its function version fn(x). For a parameter δ, we denote by
s̃ize(x; δ) the minimum size of a circuit C such that fn(x)(y) = C(y) on at least a (1 − δ)
fraction of inputs y.
For a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} and an integer k ∈ N, we denote by fk : ({0, 1}n)k →
{0, 1}k the direct product of f . We denote by f⊕k : ({0, 1}n)k → {0, 1} the function ⊕k ◦ fk,
where ⊕k is the parity function on k-bit inputs.
2.2 Pseudorandomness
Let G : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m and D : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be functions. For an ε > 0, we say that
D ε-distinguishes the output distribution of G(-) from the uniform distribution if
Pr
z∼{0,1}d
[D(G(z)) = 1]− Pr
w∼{0,1}m
[D(w) = 1] ≥ ε
In this case, we refer D as a ε-distinguisher for G. Conversely, G is said to ε-fool D if D is not
an ε-distinguisher for G. Similarly, we say that D ε-avoids G if Prw∼{0,1}m [D(w) = 1] ≥ ε
and D(G(z)) = 0 for every z ∈ {0, 1}d. By default, we assume that ε := 12 .
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For a circuit class C and functions s : N → N and ε : N → [0, 1], a family of functions
G = {G : {0, 1}s(n) → {0, 1}n}n∈N is said to be a pseudorandom generator that ε-fools C if,
for all large n ∈ N and any circuit C ∈ C of n inputs, G ε(n)-fools C. We say that G is a
hitting set generator secure against C if for all large n ∈ N, there is no circuit D ∈ C on n
inputs that avoids Gn.
2.3 Circuits
We measure circuit size by the number of gates (except for the input gates). For a circuit type
C and s ∈ N and δ ∈ [0, 1], we denote by C̃(s; δ) the class of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
such that there exists a circuit of size s such that Prx∼{0,1}n [f(x) = C(x)] ≥ 1 − δ. We
define C(s) := C̃(s; 0). For the standard circuit class, we use the notation S̃IZE(s; δ) and
SIZE(s).
2.4 Time-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity
We fix an efficient universal Turing machine U . Time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity is
defined as follows.
I Definition 17 (Time-bounded Kolmogorov Complexity). The t-time-bounded A-oracle
Kolmogorov complexity of a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is defined as
Kt,A(x) := { |d| | UA outputs x in t steps on input d },
where A is an oracle and t ∈ N.
3 Meta-Computational View of Cryptographic PRG Constructions
In this section, we provide a meta-computational view of cryptographic pseudorandom
generator constructions.
3.1 Gap(KSAT vs K)
We present a proof of the following result.
I Reminder of Theorem 4. Let A be any oracle. If DistNPA⊆ AvgP, then Gap(KA vs K) ∈ P.
At the core of the proof of Theorem 4 is to use a black-box PRG construction whose
advice complexity is small. Following [32], we observe that a k-wise direct product generator,
which is one of the simplest constructions of pseudorandom generators, has small advice
complexity.
I Theorem 18 (Direct Product Generator [32]). For any parameters k, ` ∈ N and ε > 0, there
exist an oracle algorithm DP(-)k : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d+k that takes an oracle f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}
and a reconstruction algorithm Rec such that, for any f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} and any ε-
distinguisher D : {0, 1}d+k → {0, 1} for DPfk, there exists an advice function A : {0, 1}r →




∀z ∈ {0, 1}`, RecD(z; s,A(s)) = f(z)
]
≥ ε2k ,
where A is computable by a D-oracle circuit of size poly(k/ε, 2`), the seed length d is at most
O((` + log(k/ε)) · k), the advice complexity a is at most k + O(log(k/ε)), the randomness
complexity r is at most O(d), and Rec is computable in time poly(k/ε, 2`).
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For the proof of Theorem 18, we make use of the following list-decodable error-correcting
code, which can be constructed by concatenating a Reed-Solomon code with an Hadamard
code.
I Lemma 19 (List-Decodable Error-Correcting Code; cf. [62, 46]). There exists a function
Enc such that:
1. Enc(x;N, ε) outputs a string of length N̂ = poly(N, 1/ε) for any x ∈ {0, 1}N , and is
computable in time poly(N, 1/ε).
2. There exists a deterministic algorithm Dec(-;N, ε) running in time poly(N, 1/ε) such
that, given any r ∈ {0, 1}N̂ , outputs a list of all the strings x ∈ {0, 1}N such that
Dist(r,Enc(x;N, ε)) ≤ 12 − ε, and the size of the list is at most poly(1/ε).
Proof Sketch of Theorem 18. We describe the pseudorandom generator construction DPfk ,
which we call a k-wise direct product generator. Let Enc denote the error-correcting code
of Lemma 19, and let f̂ : {0, 1}̂̀ → {0, 1} be the function specified by the truth table
Enc(f ; 2`, ε′ := ε/2k) ∈ {0, 1}2̂̀, where ̂̀= O(`+ log(k/ε)). The pseudorandom generator
construction Gfk : {0, 1}
̂̀k → {0, 1}̂̀k+k is defined as
Gfk(z
1, · · · , zk) := (z1, · · · , zk, f̂(z1), · · · , f̂(zk))
for (z1, · · · , zk) ∈
(
{0, 1}̂̀)k, and d := ̂̀k.
Since the security proof of DPfk can be proved by using a standard hybrid argument (see,









D(z1, · · · , zk, b1, · · · , bk) = 1
]
≥ ε.
For any i ∈ {0, · · · , k}, define the ith hybrid distribution Hi as the distribution of
(z1, · · · , zk, f̂(z1), · · · , f̂(zi), bi+1, · · · , bk),
where z̄ = (z1, · · · , zk) ∼
(
{0, 1}̂̀)k and bi+1, · · · , bk ∼ {0, 1}. By this definition, H0 is
identically distributed with the uniform distribution, and Hk is an identical distribution with
















≥ ε2k . (1)
Consider the following deterministic algorithm RecD0 (z; s,A0(s)): The coin flip sequence
s is regarded as i ∼ [k], z1, · · · , zi−1, zi+1, · · · , zk ∼ {0, 1}̂̀, and b ∼ {0, 1}k. We set
zi := z and A0(s) := (f̂(z1), · · · , f̂(zi−1), bi, · · · , bk). Then, the output of RecD0 is defined as
D(z̄, A0(s))⊕ 1⊕ bi.










with probability at least ε/2k over the random choice of s = (i, z[k]\{i}, b). By evaluating
RecD0 (z, s, A0(s)) for every z ∈ {0, 1}̂̀, we obtain a string f ′ ∈ {0, 1}2̂̀ that encodes a
function that agrees with f̂ on at least a (1/2 + ε/2k)-fraction of inputs.
The final reconstruction algorithm RecD(z; s,A(s)) runs the decoding algorithm
Dec(f ′; 2`, ε/2k) of Lemma 19, and obtains a list of strings f1, · · · , fL. We define the
advice function A as A(s) := (A0(s), j), where j ∈ [L] is an index such that fj coincides with
the truth table of f . The algorithm RecD(z; s,A(s)) outputs the zth position of fj .
The advice complexity is at most |A0(-)|+ logL = k +O(log(k/ε)). Moreover, it is easy
to observe that the advice function A(s) can be computed in time poly(k/ε, 2`), given s as
input and oracle access to f and D. By hard-wiring f into a circuit, the advice function A
can be computed by a D-oracle circuit of size poly(k/ε, 2`). J
One of important ingredients of the proof for Theorem 4 is a pseudorandom generator
constructed by Buhrman, Fortnow, and Pavan [11].
I Lemma 20 (Buhrman, Fortnow, and Pavan [11]). If DistNP ⊆ AvgP, then there exist
a constant c and a pseudorandom generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}c logn → {0, 1}n}n∈N that
(1/n)-fools size-n circuits.
Another ingredient is the fact that DistNPA ⊆ AvgP implies that a dense subset of
A-oracle time-bounded Kolmogorov-random strings can be rejected in polynomial time.
I Lemma 21 ([31]). Assume that DistNPA ⊆ AvgP. Then, there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm M such that
1. M(x, 1t) = 1 for every x such that Kt,A(x) < |x| − 1, and
2. Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x, 1t) = 0] ≥ 14 for every n ∈ N and every t ∈ N.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Under the assumption that DistNPA ⊆ AvgP, we have the secure
pseudorandom generator G = {Gm : {0, 1}c0 logm → {0, 1}m}m∈N of Lemma 20. In partic-
ular, Promise-BPP = Promise-P; thus it suffices to present a randomized polynomial-time
algorithm M1 for computing Gapτ (KA vs K) for some polynomial τ .
Fix any input (x, 1s, 1t), where x ∈ {0, 1}∗ is a string of length n ∈ N and s, t ∈ N. Take
the k-wise direct product generator DPfn(x)k : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}d+k of Theorem 18, where k is
some parameter chosen later and ε := 18 . Let M0 be the polynomial-time algorithm M of
Lemma 21. Let τ0 be some polynomial chosen later.
The randomized algorithm M1 operates as follows. On input (x, 1s, 1t), M1 samples a
string z̄ ∼ {0, 1}d uniformly at random. Then, M1 simulates M0 on input (DPfn(x)k (z̄), 1t
′),
where t′ := τ0(n, t), and accepts if and only if M0 accepts. (That is, M1(x, 1s, 1t) is defined
to be M0(DPfn(x)k (z̄), 1t
′) for a random z̄ ∼ {0, 1}d.)
We claim the correctness of the algorithm M1 below.
B Claim 22.
1. If Kt,A(x) ≤ s, then M1(x, 1s, 1t) accepts with probability 1.
2. If Kτ(n,t)(x) > s+ log τ(n, t), then M1(x, 1s, 1t) rejects with probability at least 18 .
We claim the first item. Fix any z̄ ∈ {0, 1}d. Since the output DPfn(x)k (z̄) of the direct
product generator can be described by n, k ∈ N, the seed z̄ ∈ {0, 1}d and the program for
describing x of size Kt,A(x) in time t′ = τ0(n, t), where τ0 is some polynomial, it holds that
Kt
′,A(DPfn(x)k (z̄)) ≤ d+ K
t,A(x) + c1 logn, (2)
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for some constant c1. We set k := s + c1 logn + 2. Note that under the assumption that
Kt,A(x) ≤ s, Equation (2) is less than d+k−1. Therefore, by Lemma 21,M0(DPfn(x)k (z̄)) = 1
for every z̄ ∈ {0, 1}d; thus M1 accepts.
We claim the second item, by proving its contrapositive. Assume thatM1(x, 1s, 1t) rejects






























By the property of the reconstruction algorithm Rec of Theorem 18, there exists an advice




∀z ∈ {0, 1}dlogne, Rec¬M0(-,1
t)(z; ρ,A′(ρ)) = fn(x)(z)
]
≥ 116k , (3)
where the advice complexity a is at most k + O(log(k/ε)) = s + O(log(nk/ε)). Now we
derandomize the random choice of ρ of Equation (3) by using the secure pseudorandom
generator G. That is, we argue that ρ can be replaced with G(ρ0) for some short ρ0, which
enables us to obtain a short description for x. To this end, we define a statistical test
T : {0, 1}r → {0, 1} that checks the condition of Equation (3) as follows:
T (ρ) = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀z ∈ {0, 1}dlogne, Rec¬M0(-,1
t)(z; ρ,A′(ρ)) = fn(x)(z),
for each ρ ∈ {0, 1}r.
We claim that T can be computed by a small circuit. Indeed, by Theorem 18, the advice
function A′ can be computed by a M0(-, 1t)-oracle circuit of size poly(k, n), and Rec can be
computed in time poly(k, n) ≤ poly(n) with oracle access to M0(-, 1t).5 The oracle M0(-, 1t)
can be simulated by a circuit of size poly(d+ k, t) ≤ poly(n, t). Overall, T is computable by
a circuit of size m := poly(n, t); here we take m large enough so that m ≥ r and m > 16k.
Now we replace the random bits ρ ∈ {0, 1}r with the first r bits of the pseudorandom
sequence Gm(ρ0). By Equation (3), we have Prρ∼{0,1}r [T (ρ) = 1] ≥ 116k . It follows from the
property of Gm that
Pr
ρ0∼{0,1}c0 logm
[T (G(ρ0)) = 1] > 0.
In particular, there exists a seed ρ0 ∈ {0, 1}c0 logm such that T (G(ρ0)) = 1.
We are ready to present the algorithm for describing x. In order to describe x, it takes as
a description n, t,m ∈ N, the seed ρ0 ∈ {0, 1}c0 logm, and the advice string α := A′(G(ρ0)) ∈
{0, 1}a. Since T (G(ρ0)) = 1, the string x can be obtained by concatenating the output of
Rec¬M0(-,1
t)(z;G(ρ0), α) for all z ∈ [n]. The running time of this procedure can be bounded
by τ1(n, t) for some polynomial τ1. Therefore,
Kτ1(n,t)(x) ≤ a+ c0 logm+O(lognt) ≤ s+O(lognt).
5 We may assume without loss of generality that k := s + O(log n) = O(n), as otherwise we trivially have
Kt,A(x) ≤ s.
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In particular, by choosing a polynomial τ large enough, we have
Kτ(n,t)(x) ≤ Kτ1(n,t)(x) ≤ s+ log τ(n, t).
This completes the proof of Claim 22.
Since M1 is a one-sided-error algorithm, the success probability can be amplified by
repeating the computation of M1 for independent random coin flips. We thus conclude that
Gapτ (KA vs K) is in Promise-BPP = Promise-P. J
Let ΣkSAT denote the canonical Σpk-complete problem. By using the disjointness of
Gap(KΣkSAT vs K), we immediately obtain the following.
I Corollary 23. If DistPH ⊆ AvgP, then for any constant k ∈ N, there exists a polynomial τ
such that Kτ(|x|,t)(x) ≤ Kt,ΣkSAT(x) + log τ(|x|, t) for any x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and t ∈ N.
Proof. Let A := ΣkSAT. By Theorem 4, under the assumption that DistNPA ⊆ DistPH ⊆
AvgP, there exists an algorithmM such thatM(x, 1s, 1t) = 1 for every x such that Kt,A(x) ≤ s
and M(x, 1s, 1t) = 0 for every x such that Kτ(|x|,t)(x) > s + c log |x|, for any s ∈ N and
t ∈ N. In particular, the set of Yes and that of No instances are disjoint, as otherwise we
have 0 = M(x, 1s, 1t) = 1 for some instance (x, 1s, 1t), which is a contradiction. For any
x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and t ∈ N, define s := Kt,A(x); then we obtain that Kpoly(|x|,t)(x) ≤ s+log τ(|x|, t)
by the disjointness. J
An important corollary is that NP-hardness of Gap(KΣkSAT vs K) is sufficient for proving
an equivalence between worst-case and average-case complexity of PH.
I Restatement of Corollary 6. Assume that Gap(KΣkSAT vs K) is “NP-hard” for some
k ∈ N in the sense that
NP 6⊆ BPP =⇒ Gap(KΣkSAT vs K) 6∈ P.
Then,
DistPH 6⊆ AvgP ⇐⇒ PH 6= P.
Proof. It is obvious that PH = P implies that DistPH ⊆ AvgP. Thus we prove the converse
direction. Assume that DistPH ⊆ AvgP. By Theorem 4, we obtain Gap(KΣkSAT vs K) ∈ P
for any constant k ∈ N. By the assumption, we have NP ⊆ BPP; moreover, by Lemma 20, we
also have BPP = P. Therefore, it follows that NP = P, which is equivalent to PH = P. J
Under the plausible assumption that ENP 6= E, we observe that Gap(KSAT vs K) is
non-disjoint.
I Proposition 24. If ENP 6= E, then, for some polynomial τ0 and any polynomial τ , there are
infinitely many strings x such that Kt,SAT(x) = O(log |x|) and Kτ(|x|)(x) > log τ(|x|), where
t := τ0(|x|).
Proof. By [12], the assumption is equivalent to ENP 6⊆ E/O(n). Take a language L ∈
ENP \ E/O(n). For each n ∈ N, define xn to be the truth table of length 2n that encodes
the characteristic function of L ∩ {0, 1}n. Since xn can be described in τ0(|xn|) = poly(|xn|)
time given n ∈ N and oracle access to SAT, we have Kt,SAT(x) = O(log |xn|). On the other
hand, if Kτ(|xn|)(xn) ≤ log τ(|xn|) for all large n ∈ N, there exists an advice string of length
log τ(|xn|) = O(n) that makes it possible to compute L∩{0, 1}n in time poly(τ(|xn|)) = 2O(n),
which contradicts L 6∈ E/O(n). J
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Finally, we observe that the complexity of Gap(KSAT vs K) is closely related to the
complexity of MINKT.
I Proposition 25. For any polynomial τ , the following hold.
Gapτ (K vs K) is reducible to Gapτ (KSAT vs K) via an identity map.
If Gapτ (KSAT vs K) is disjoint, then Gapτ (KSAT vs K) is reducible to MINKT; in
particular, Gapτ (KSAT vs K) ∈ NP.
Proof. The first item is obvious because Kt,SAT(x) ≤ Kt(x) for any t ∈ N and x ∈ {0, 1}∗.
For the second item, let (ΠYes,ΠNo) denote Gapτ (KSAT vs K). Since (ΠNo,ΠNo) is a problem
of checking whether Kτ(|x|,t)(x) ≤ s + log τ(|x|, t) given (x, 1s, 1t) as input, it is reducible
to MINKT. In particular, (ΠYes,ΠNo) ∈ NP holds as well under the assumption that it is
disjoint. J
3.2 Gap(F vs F−1): PRG Construction from One-Way Functions
Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin, and Luby [29] showed that a cryptographic pseudorandom
generator can be constructed from any one-way function. In this section, we view the
black-box PRG construction from a meta-computational perspective, which leads us to the
promise problem Gap(F vs F−1), which is a problem of asking whether a given function f
is computable by a small circuit or f is hard to invert by any small circuit. Here we assume
that the function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is given as oracle, and we focus on an algorithm that
runs in time poly(n). In other words, we consider a sublinear-time algorithm that is given
random access to the truth table of f .
I Definition 26. For a function τ : N × N → N, Gapτ (F vs F−1) is a promise problem
(ΠYes,ΠNo) defined as follows. The input consists of a size parameter s ∈ N, an integer
n ∈ N, and black-box access to a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
The set ΠYes consists of inputs (n, s, f) such that size(f) ≤ s.









I Theorem 27. If DistNP ⊆ AvgP, then there exist a polynomial τ and a coRP-type ran-
domized algorithm M that solves Gapτ (F vs F−1) = (ΠYes,ΠNo) on input (n, s) in time
poly(n, s). That is, M is a randomized oracle algorithm such that
1. PrM [Mf (n, s) = 1] = 1 for every (n, s, f) ∈ ΠYes,
2. PrM [Mf (n, s) = 0] ≥ 12 for every (n, s, f) ∈ ΠNo, and
3. Mf (n, s) runs in time poly(n, s).
For the proof, we make use of the following black-box construction of a pseudorandom
generator based on any one-way function.
I Lemma 28 (A black-box PRG Construction from Any OWF [29]). There exists a polynomial
d = d(n) such that, for a parameter m ∈ N, there exists a polynomial-time oracle algorithm
G
(-)
m : {0, 1}d(n) → {0, 1}m that takes a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and there exists an












[Rf,D(f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))] ≥ 12 .
The running time of G(-)m and R is at most poly(n,m).
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Proof Sketch. Since a weakly one-way function exists if and only if a strongly one-way
function exists ([72]), it suffices to present a reduction that inverts f with probability at
least 1/poly(n,m). (To be more specific, we first amplify the hardness of f by taking a
direct product f t(x1, · · · , xt) := (f(x1), · · · , f(xt)), where t is some appropriately chosen
parameter, and then apply the HILL construction to f t described below.)
We invoke the pseudorandom generator construction GfHILL of Håstad, Impagliazzo, Levin,
and Luby [29] based on f . They presented a security reduction R such that if there exists a
function D that distinguishes GfHILL from the uniform distribution, then an oracle algorithm
Rf,D(f(x)) can compute an element in f−1(f(x)) with probability at least 1/poly(n,m) over
the choice of x ∼ {0, 1}n and the internal randomness of R. J
Proof of Theorem 27. Let G(-) be the black-box pseudorandom generator construction of
Lemma 28, and let R be the security reduction of Lemma 28.
Under the assumption that DistNP ⊆ AvgP, by Lemma 21, there exists a polynomial-
time algorithm M such that M(x, 1t) = 1 for every x such that Kt(x) < |x| − 1, and
Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x, 1t) = 0] ≥ 14 for every n ∈ N and every t ∈ N.
The algorithm M ′ for computing Gap(F vs F−1) is defined as follows. Let f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n and s ∈ N be inputs. Define m := p(n, s) for some polynomial p chosen later. Pick a
random z ∈ {0, 1}n. Then M ′ accepts if and only if M(Gfm(z), 1t) accepts for a sufficiently
large t = poly(n, s).
We claim the correctness of M ′ below.
B Claim 29.
1. M ′ accepts any f such that size(f) ≤ s with probability 1.
2. M ′ rejects any f such that Prx
[
Cf (f(x)) ∈ f−1(f(x))
]
< 12 with probability at least
1
8 .
We claim that any f such that size(f) ≤ s is accepted by the algorithm M ′. Indeed,
since f is computable by some circuit of size s and Gfm is polynomial-time-computable, the
output of the generator Gfm(z) can be described by using the description of the circuit of
size s, the seed z of length d(n), and n,m ∈ N in polynomial time; thus, for a sufficiently
large t = poly(n, s),
Kt(Gfm(z)) ≤ d(n) + Õ(s) +O(logn).
Choosing m = p(n, s) large enough, this is bounded by m− 2. Thus M ′ accepts.





M(Gfm(z), 1t) = 1
]
≥ 78 .




M(w, 1t) = 1
]
≤ 34 .









By fixing the internal randomness of R and simulating the polynomial-time algorithm
Rf,M(-,1
t) by a polynomial-size circuit Cf , we conclude that f can be inverted by the oracle
circuit Cf of size poly(n, s) =: τ(n, s). Thus f is not a No instance of Gapτ (F vs F−1). J
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I Remark 30. In fact, the assumption that DistNP ⊆ AvgP of Theorem 27 can be weakened
to the assumption that there exists a P-natural property useful against SIZE(2o(n)) (which
is essentially equivalent to an errorless heuristic algorithm for MCSP [34, 31]). Indeed,
as in [2, 60, 5], the pseudorandom function generator construction of [25] can be used to
construct a black-box pseudorandom generator Gf based on a one-way function f that satisfies
size(Gf (z)) ≤ poly(|z|, log |Gf (z)|) for any seed z ∈ {0, 1}d; such a pseudorandom generator
Gf can be distinguished from the uniform distribution by using the natural property.
We now explain that Gap(F vs F−1) is conjectured to be non-disjoint. An auxiliary-input
one-way function (AIOWF) f = {fx : {0, 1}p(|x|) → {0, 1}q(|x|)}x∈{0,1}∗ is a polynomial-time-
computable function such that, for some infinite set I, for any non-uniform polynomial-time
algorithm A, Pry
[
A(x, fx(y)) ∈ f−1x (fx(y))
]
< 1/nω(1) for all large n ∈ N and any x ∈ I.
This is a weaker cryptographic primitive than a one-way function (i.e., the existence of a
one-way function implies that of an auxiliary-input one-way function). Ostrovsky [56] showed
that non-triviality of SZK implies the existence of an auxiliary-input one-way function. (see
also [68]). We observe that the existence of an auxiliary-input one-way function implies the
non-disjointness of Gap(F vs F−1).
I Proposition 31. If there exists an auxiliary-input one-way function f = {fx : {0, 1}p(|x|) →
{0, 1}q(|x|)}x∈{0,1}∗ , then, for any polynomial τ , Gapτ (F vs F−1) is non-disjoint.
Proof. Take an infinite set I ⊆ {0, 1}∗ that is hard for polynomial-size circuits to invert
{fx}x∈I . Since f is polynomial-time-computable, size(fx) ≤ nc for some constant c, where
n = |x|. We set the size parameter s := nc. On the other hand, by the property of AIOWF,









for a sufficiently large x ∈ I. This means that fx is a Yes and No instance of Gapτ (F vs F−1).
J
An immediate corollary of Theorem 27 and Proposition 31 is that the existence of AIOWF
implies DistNP 6⊆ AvgP (which is already shown in [31]). An interesting open question is to
prove “NP-hardness” of Gap(F vs F−1), which has the following important consequence:
I Corollary 32. If, for any polynomial τ , it is “NP-hard” to solve Gapτ (F vs F−1) in time
poly(n, s), then the worst-case and average-case complexity of NP is equivalent in the sense
that P 6= NP iff DistNP 6⊆ AvgP.
Proof. The assumption that Gap(F vs F−1) is “NP-hard” means that, for any polynomial
τ , if there exists a coRP-type algorithm that solves Gapτ (F vs F−1) on input (n, s) in time
poly(n, s), then NP ⊆ BPP. If DistNP ⊆ AvgP, then Theorem 27 implies that there exists
some polynomial τ such that Gapτ (F vs F−1) can be solved by a coRP-type algorithm in
time poly(n, s). By the assumption, we obtain NP ⊆ BPP = P, where the last equality is
from Lemma 20. J
4 Meta-Computational View of Complexity-Theoretic PRG
Constructions
We now turn our attention to a meta-computational view of complexity-theoretic PRG
constructions.
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4.1 Universal Hitting Set Generators and Kolmogorov Complexity
We review the notion of KS- and Kt-complexity and present definitions of universal hitting set
generators. The notion of KS-complexity was introduced in [2] as a space-bounded analogue
of Kt-complexity. Here we slightly modify the definition and add an additive term of +2 so
that a result about a universal hitting set generator becomes cleaner.
I Definition 33. For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, the KS complexity of x is defined as
KS(x) := min{ |d|+ s+ 2 | Ud(i) outputs xi in space s for every i ∈ [|x|+ 1] }.
Here xi denotes the ith bit of x for i ∈ [|x|], and x|x|+1 := ⊥.
We consider the following universal hitting set generator.
I Definition 34 (Universal Space-Bounded Hitting Set Generator). For a function s : N→ N,
define HSs = {HSsn : {0, 1}s(n) → {0, 1}n}n∈N as the function computed by the following
algorithm: If the input is of the form 1t0d01a for some t, a ∈ N and d ∈ {0, 1}∗, HSsn
simulates Ud(i) using at most t space, for every i ∈ [n+ 1]. If every simulation succeeds
and Ud(i) ∈ {0, 1} for i ∈ [n] and Ud(n+ 1) = ⊥, then output Ud(1) · · ·Ud(n). Otherwise,
output 0n.
The hitting set generator HS is universal in the sense that, if there exists a hitting set
generator G of seed length s(n) that is computable in s(n) space, then HSO(s)n is also a
hitting set generator. This observation immediately follows from the following property.
I Proposition 35 (Universality of HS). For every function s : N→ N and n ∈ N, the image
of HSsn contains every string x ∈ {0, 1}n such that KS(x) ≤ s(n). Moreover, HSsn can be
computed in O(s(n) + logn) space.
Proof. Consider any string x of length n such that KS(x) ≤ s(n). By the definition of KS
complexity, there exists a description d ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that Ud(i) outputs xi using at most
t space for every i ∈ [n+ 1], where |d| + t + 2 ≤ s(n). By the definition of HSsn, we have
HSsn(1t0d01a) = x for a := s(n)− t− |d| − 2 ≥ 0. J
We recall Levin’s resource-bounded Kolmogorov complexity and define a time-bounded
version of a universal hitting set generator.
I Definition 36 ([47]). For a string x ∈ {0, 1}∗, Levin’s Kt complexity of x is defined as
Kt(x) := min{ |d|+ t+ 2 | Ud(i) outputs xi in time 2t for every i ∈ [|x|+ 1] }.
I Definition 37 (Universal Time-Bounded Hitting Set Generator). For a function s : N→ N,
define Hts = {Htsn : {0, 1}s(n) → {0, 1}n}n∈N as the function computed by the following
algorithm: If the input is of the form 1t0d01a for some t, a ∈ N and d ∈ {0, 1}∗, Htsn simulates
Ud(i) for 2t time, for every i ∈ [n+ 1]. If every simulation succeeds and Ud(i) ∈ {0, 1} for
i ∈ [n] and Ud(n+ 1) = ⊥, then output Ud(1) · · ·Ud(n). Otherwise, output 0n.
I Proposition 38 (Universality of Ht). For every function s : N→ N and n ∈ N, the image
of Htsn contains every string x ∈ {0, 1}n such that Kt(x) ≤ s(n). Moreover, the range of Htsn
can be enumerated in time Õ(2s(n)+logn).
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4.2 Advice and Resource-Bounded Kolmogorov Complexity
In order to define meta-computational circuit lower-bound problems, we modify the standard
notion of advice. Usually, a complexity class with advice such as E/O(n) is defined as a
subset of functions f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1} that are defined on all the strings of any length. Here,
for any n ∈ N, we define “DTIME(2O(n))/nO(n)” as a subset of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
where the superscript n in “/n” is appended in order to emphasize that it depends on n.
I Definition 39. For any integers t, a, n ∈ N, we denote by DTIME(t)/na the class of
functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that there exists a Turing machine M whose description
length is a and that outputs f(x) on input x ∈ {0, 1}n in time t. Similarly, let DSPACE(t)/na
denote the class of functions f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that there exists a Turing machine M
whose description length is a and that outputs f(x) on input x ∈ {0, 1}n in space t.
This definition is slightly different from the standard notion of complexity classes with
advice, but these are essentially the same. In order to clarify the difference, for functions
t, a : N → N, let DTIME(t)/KLa denote the complexity class DTIME(t) with a-bit advice
strings in the standard sense of Karp and Lipton [42].6 That is, a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}
is in DTIME(t)/KLa if and only if there exists a Turing machine M such that, for any n ∈ N,
there exists an advice string αn ∈ {0, 1}a(n) such that M outputs f(x) on input (x, αn) in
time t(n) for every x ∈ {0, 1}n. Then, the advice “/n” and the Karp–Lipton advice “/KL”
are equivalent in the following sense.
I Fact 40. For any functions t, a : N→ N and any family of functions f = {fn : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}}n∈N (which is identified with a function f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}), the following are equival-
ent.
1. There exists a constant c such that f ∈ DTIME(t′)/KLa′, where t′(n) := t(n)c + c and
a′(n) := c · a(n) + c.
2. There exists a constant c such that, for any n ∈ N, fn ∈ DTIME(t(n)c + c)/nc · a(n) + c.
Proof Sketch. If f ∈ DTIME(t′)/KLa′, then there exists a machine M that takes an advice
string αn on inputs of length n. For each n ∈ N, define Mn to be the machine that, on
input x, simulates M on input (x, αn); the description length of Mn is at most O(|αn|),
and thus fn ∈ DTIME(t(n)O(1))/nO(a(n)). Conversely, if, for any n ∈ N, there exists a
Turing machine Mn whose description length is O(a(n)), then a universal Turing machine U
witnesses f ∈ DTIME(t′)/KLa′. J
The advice “/n” is equivalent to Kt-complexity up to a constant factor in the following
sense.
I Fact 41. For any function t : N→ N such that t(n) ≥ n and for any family of functions
f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}}n∈N, the following are equivalent.
1. fn ∈ DTIME(t(n)O(1))/nO(log t(n)) for all large n ∈ N.
2. Kt(fn) = O(log t(n)) for all large n ∈ N.
4.3 Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems (MCLPs)
We define promise problems of distinguishing the truth table of explicit functions (e.g.,
computable in DTIME(2cn)/ncn) from the truth table of hard functions (e.g., that cannot be
computed in SIZE(2εn)). We call these Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems
(MCLPs).
6 It is also common to use the notation DTIME(t(n))/KLa(n), where n is an indeterminate.
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I Definition 42 (Meta-computational Circuit Lower-bound Problems; MCLPs). Let E ,D be
families of functions. The E vs D problem is defined as the following promise problem
(ΠYes,ΠNo).
ΠYes := { tt(f) | f ∈ E },
ΠNo := { tt(f) | f 6∈ D }.
We will mainly consider a non-uniform computational model for computing the E vs D
problem; for N ∈ N, we denote by (E vs D)N the problem restricted to the input length of N .





For a circuit class C, we say that (E vs D) ∈ i.o.C(s(N)) if, for every constant c, there exists
a family of C-circuits {CN}N∈N of size s(N) such that CN solves the promise problem (Ec vs
















The definition of the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem given here is slightly different from
Definition 10 given earlier. In Definition 10, we defined the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem by
using the notion of Kt-complexity; however, these definitions are essentially equivalent in
light of Fact 41.




below. One can observe that
the open question of whether DSPACE(n) 6⊆ i.o.SIZE(2o(n)) is closely related to the
DSPACE(n) vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem.
I Proposition 43. The following are equivalent.
1. DSPACE(n) 6⊆ i.o.SIZE(2εn) for some constant ε > 0.
2. No circuit can solve the DSPACE(n) vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem for all large n ∈ N.
3. No circuit can solve the DSPACE(n) vs S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) problem for all large n ∈ N.
4. There exist some constants c ∈ N, α > 0 such that, for all large n ∈ N, there exists a
function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} such that f ∈ DSPACE(cn)/ncn and f 6∈ S̃IZE(2αn; 12−2
−αn).
Proof. First, observe that Item 3 is equivalent to Item 4 by the definition. We claim that
Item 1 implies Item 4. By using a locally-decodable error-correcting code, it can be shown
that Item 1 is equivalent to DSPACE(n) 6⊆ i.o.S̃IZE(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn) for some constant α > 0
(cf. [63, 44]). Take a problem L ∈ DSPACE(n) \ i.o.S̃IZE(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn). For each n ∈ N, let
fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be the characteristic function of L∩{0, 1}n. Then, there exists a constant
c such that, for all large n ∈ N, fn ∈ DSPACE(cn)/ncn and fn 6∈ S̃IZE(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn), which
completes the proof of Item 4. It is immediate from the definition that Item 4 implies Item 2.
We claim that Item 2 implies Item 1. Let f = {fn : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}}n∈N be a family
of functions such that fn ∈ DSPACE(cn)/ncn and fn 6∈ SIZE(2αn) for all large n ∈ N. In
particular, for all large n ∈ N, there exists some machine Mn of description length cn that
computes fn(x) on input x ∈ {0, 1}n in space cn. Let L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be a language such
that (x,M) ∈ L if and only if the description length of a Turing machine M is c|x| and M
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accepts x in space c|x|. It is clear that L ∈ DSPACE(n). Moreover, for all large n ∈ N, the
characteristic function of {x ∈ {0, 1}n | (x,Mn) ∈ L } is equal to fn; thus, it requires circuits
of size 2αn. Therefore, L 6∈ i.o.SIZE(2αn/(c+1)). J
It is also possible to define MCLPs whose non-disjointness characterizes other circuit







is non-disjoint if and only if EXP/poly 6⊆ SIZE(2o(n)).
4.4 MCLPs from HSG Constructions
We formalize the notion of black-box PRG and HSG construction and then we present a
general connection between black-box PRG and HSG constructions and meta-computational
circuit lower bound problems.
I Definition 44 (Black-Box PRG and HSG Construction). Let G(-) : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be an
oracle algorithm that expects an oracle of the form f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}. Let C be a circuit
class and R(-) be an oracle circuit class. The algorithm G is referred to as a black-box
C-pseudorandom generator (resp. C-hitting set generator) construction with R-reconstruction
and error parameter ε if the following hold.
C-Construction For any seed z ∈ {0, 1}d, there exists a C-circuit that takes tt(f) as input
and outputs Gf (z).
R-Reconstruction For any function f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} and any function D : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1}, if D is an ε-distinguisher for Gf (resp. D ε-avoids Gf ), then f ∈ RD.
We now present a generic connection between MCLPs and HSG constructions.
I Theorem 45. Let G(-) : {0, 1}s → {0, 1}m be a black-box C-construction with R-reconstruc-
tion that takes a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Define N := 2n. Let H : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m
be a function such that Gf (z) ∈ Im(H) for every f ∈ E and every z ∈ {0, 1}d. Let
D : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} be any function that ε-avoids H. Then, the following hold.
1. If Gf is a HSG construction with error parameter ε, then (E vs RD)N ∈ AND2s ◦ NOT ◦
D ◦ C.
2. If Gf is a PRG construction with error parameter ε/2, then (E vs RD)N ∈ ANDO(N/ε) ◦
NOT ◦D ◦ C.
Proof. Let G(-) be a HSG construction with error parameter ε. We first present a randomized
circuit for solving (E vs RD) on inputs of length N . Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} denote an input.




, where z is an auxiliary input (that
will be regarded as non-deterministic bits or random bits). We claim that D1 can solve (E vs
D) co-nondeterministically.
B Claim 46.
1. If f ∈ E , then D1(f ; z) = 0 for every z ∈ {0, 1}s.
2. If f 6∈ RD, then D1(f ; z) = 1 for some z ∈ {0, 1}s.
Suppose that f is a Yes instance of (E vs D), that is, f ∈ E . By the assumption, we have










= 0 for every z ∈ {0, 1}s. This means that D ε-avoids
Gf . By the reconstruction property of Gf , we obtain f ∈ RD. Taking its contrapositive, it




= 1 for some z ∈ {0, 1}s. This completes
the proof of Claim 46.
Now consider a circuit D2 defined as D2(f) :=
∧
z∈{0,1}s ¬D1(f ; z). Then, it follows from
Claim 46 that the circuit D2 solves (E vs RD) on inputs of length N .
We move on to the case when G(-) is a PRG construction. In this case, we claim
that the second item of Claim 46 can be strengthened to the following: If f 6∈ RD, then
Prz∼{0,1}s [D1(f ; z) = 1] ≥ ε2 . We prove the contrapositive of this claim. Assume that
Prz∼{0,1}s [D1(f ; z) = 1] < ε2 . Since D ε-avoids H, we have Prw∼{0,1}m [D(w) = 1] ≥ ε.
Therefore, D ε2 -distinguishes G
f (-) from the uniform distribution; by the reconstruction of
G(-), we obtain f ∈ RD, as desired.
Therefore, D1(-; z) is a one-sided-error randomized circuit that computes (E vs RD)
with probability at least ε/2. Now define a randomized circuit D′2 such that D′2(f) :=∧k
i=1 ¬D1(f ; zi), where z1, · · · , zk ∼ {0, 1}s are chosen independently and k is a parameter
chosen later. Then, it is easy to see that D′2(f) = 1 for any f ∈ E ; on the other hand, for any
f 6∈ RD, D′2(f) = 1 with probability at most (1− ε/2)k, which is less than 2−N by choosing
k = O(N/ε) large enough. By using a union bound, one can hardwire random bits in D′2 as
in Adleman’s trick [1], and obtain a deterministic AND ◦ NOT ◦D ◦ C circuit that computes
(E vs RD). J
4.5 The Nisan–Wigderson Generator
The pseudorandom generator construction of Nisan and Wigderson [53] is particularly efficient.
Indeed, each output bit of the Nisan–Wigderson generator depends on only 1 bit of the truth
table of a candidate hard function.
I Theorem 47 (Nisan–Wigderson Pseudorandom Generator Construction). For every con-
stant γ > 0 and any `,m ∈ N, there exists a C-pseudorandom generator construction
G(-) : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with R-reconstruction and error parameter ε that takes a function
f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1} such that
d = O(`), m ≤ 2`,
C = NC01, and
RD = D̃ ◦ AC02(m · 2γ`; 12 −
ε
m ).
Moreover, the output Gf (z) of the PRG can be computed in space O(`) given a function f
and a seed z as input.
We first recall the construction of the Nisan–Wigderson generator. In order to have a
space-efficient algorithm for computing the Nisan–Wigderson generator, we use the following
construction of a combinatorial design.
I Lemma 48 (Klivans and van Melkebeek [44], Viola [71]). For every constant γ > 0, for any
` ∈ N, there exist `-sized subsets S1, · · · , S2` of [d] for some d = O(`) such that
1. |Si ∩ Sj | ≤ γ · ` for every distinct i, j ∈ [2`], and
2. S1, · · · , S2` can be constructed in space O(`).
A nearly disjoint generator ND is defined based on the design.
I Definition 49. For a string z ∈ {0, 1}d and a subset S ⊆ [d] of indices, zS denotes the
string obtained by concatenating the ith bit zi of z for every i ∈ S. For `-sized subsets
S = {S1, · · · , Sm} of [d], define a nearly disjoint generator ND: {0, 1}d → ({0, 1}`)m as
ND(z) := (zS1 , · · · , zSm) for every z ∈ {0, 1}d.
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Using the nearly disjoint generator, the Nisan–Wigderson generator is defined as follows.
I Definition 50 (Nisan–Wigderson generator [53]). For a Boolean function f : {0, 1}` →
{0, 1} and for `-sized subsets S = {S1, · · · , Sm} of [d], the Nisan–Wigderson generator
NWf : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is defined as
NWf (z) := fm ◦ND(z) = f(zS1) · · · f(zSm).
It was shown in [53] that the pseudorandom generator construction is secure in the
following sense.
I Lemma 51 (Security of the Nisan–Wigderson Generator [53]). For any functions T : {0, 1}m →
{0, 1} and f : {0, 1}` → {0, 1}, for any ε > 0, if
Pr
w∼{0,1}m
[T (w) = 1]− Pr
z∼{0,1}d
[
T (NWf (z)) = 1
]
≥ ε,










Proof of Theorem 47. We use the Nisan–Wigderson generator NW(-) defined in Defini-
tion 50 (i.e., we define G(-) := NW(-)). NW(-) is an NC01-PRG construction because each bit
of NWf (z) for any fixed seed z is equal to one bit of the truth table of f . TheR-reconstruction
property of NW(-) follows from Lemma 51. J
4.6 Meta-Computational View of the Nisan–Wigderson Generator
Using the Nisan–Wigderson generator construction, we present a general connection between
the existence of hitting set generators and lower bounds for meta-computational circuit lower-
bound problems. We consider any family of circuits that is closed under taking projections
in the following sense.
I Definition 52. A class C of circuits is said to be closed under taking projections if, for any
s ∈ N, for every size-s circuit C ∈ C of n inputs, a circuit C ′ defined as C ′(x1, · · · , xn) =
C(xσ(1), · · · , xσ(n)) for some function σ : [n]→ [n] can be simulated by a size-s C-circuit.
I Theorem 53. Let C be any circuit class that is closed under taking projections. Suppose
that (E vs C̃ ◦ AC02(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn)) 6∈ i.o.AND ◦NOT ◦ C(N1+β) for some constants α, β > 0.
Then, there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable
in time nO(1) and secure against linear-size C circuits.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that, for every function s(m) = O(logm),
there exists a linear-size C circuit D that avoids the universal hitting set generator Htsm
for infinitely many m ∈ N. Given arbitrary constants c, α, β > 0, we will choose a small
constant γ > 0, and define s(m) := c′ logm/γ for some large constant c′. Then using D
that avoids Htsm, we present a AND ◦ NOT ◦ C-circuit of size N1+β that solves the Ec vs
C̃ ◦ AC02(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn) problem.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} denote the input of the MCLP. We use the Nisan–Wigderson
generator construction NWf : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m of Theorem 47, where d = O(n), m = 2γn,
and ε := 14 . By Theorem 47, this is a black-box NC
0







In order to apply Theorem 45, we claim that NWf (z) ∈ Im(Htsm) for every f ∈ Ec and
every z ∈ {0, 1}d. By Theorem 47, the output NWf (z) can be described by using a seed z
and a description for x in time NO(1), and thus
Kt(NWf (z)) ≤ |z|+ Kt(f) +O(logN) = O(n).
In particular, for a large enough constant c′, we have
Kt(NWf (z)) ≤ c′n = s(m),
By the universality of Htsm (Proposition 38) we obtain that NWf (z) ∈ Im(Htsm).
By applying Theorem 45, we have (Ec vs D̃ ◦ AC02(22γn; 12−
1
4m ))N ∈ ANDO(N)◦NOT◦D◦





AND ◦ NOT ◦ C(O(N1+γ)). Note that this holds for infinitely many N = m1/γ . By choosing
γ small enough depending on α, β, the result follows. J
We observe that the converse direction also holds. In particular, for any circuit class
C ⊆ P/poly such that C is closed under taking projections and AND ◦ NOT ◦ C = C, our
reductions in fact establish the equivalence between the existence of a hitting set generator
secure against C and a C-lower bound for the E vs S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n)) problem.
I Proposition 54 (Converse of Theorem 53). Let C be any circuit complexity class. Suppose
that there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in
time nO(1) and secure against linear-size C circuits. Then, for any constant k ∈ N, for all suf-
ficiently large N ∈ N, no NOT ◦C circuit of size Nk can solve
(




for α := 1/4 nor MKtP[O(logN), N − 1] on input length N .
Proof. We first observe that MKtP[O(logN),N−1] is reducible to (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn))
via an identity map: Take any function f ∈ S̃IZE(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn). Since the truth table of





bits of information in time
NO(1), the Kt-complexity of tt(f) is at most
Õ(Nα) +N ·H2(1/2−N−α) +O(logN) ≤ N − Ω(N1−2α),
which is much smaller than N − 1. Therefore, it suffices to prove the result only for
MKtP[O(logN), N − 1].
We prove the contrapositive. Suppose that, for some constant k ∈ N, for any constant c,
for infinitely many N ∈ N, there exists a NOT ◦ C circuit of size Nk that solves the promise
problem MKtP[c logN,N − 1]. Consider any family of functions G = {Gm : {0, 1}d logm →
{0, 1}m}m∈N computable in time md for a constant d. Let c := 4kd, and take a NOT ◦ C
circuit ¬C of size Nk that solves MKtP[c logN,N − 1] on inputs of length N .
We regard C as a circuit that takes m := Nk input bits by ignoring m−N input bits, and
in what follows we claim that the linear-size circuit C avoids Gm. For a string w ∈ {0, 1}m,
denote by wN the first N bits of w.
Let z ∈ {0, 1}d logm be any seed of G. Since G(z)N can be described by N ∈ N and
z ∈ {0, 1}d logm in time md, its Kt complexity is
Kt(G(z)N ) ≤ logN + |z|+ d logm+ o(logm) ≤ 4kd logN,
which means that G(z)N is a Yes instance of MKtP[c logN,N−1] and thus G(z) is rejected
by C.
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Now consider a string w ∼ {0, 1}m chosen uniformly at random. By a standard counting
argument, Kt(wN ) ≥ N − 1 with probability at least 12 ; thus C accepts at least a half of all
inputs. Therefore, the function G is not secure against C. J
Applying Theorem 53 to depth-d circuits C := AC0d, we obtain the following.
I Corollary 55. Let d be a constant. Suppose that (E vs ÃC0d+2(2αn; 12 − 2
−αn)) 6∈
i.o.AC0d+1(N1+β) for some constants α, β > 0. Then, there exists a hitting set gener-
ator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in time nO(1) and secure against
linear-size AC0d circuits.
This means that, in order to obtain a nearly optimal hitting set generator for AC0d, it suffices
to prove that nearly-linear-size AC0d+1 circuits cannot distinguish the truth tables of functions
in E/O(n) from the truth tables of functions that cannot be approximated by AC0d+2 circuits.
We present a proof of Theorem 13.
I Restatement of Theorem 13. The following are equivalent.





2. For any constant d, there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) →
{0, 1}n}n∈N computable in time nO(1) and secure against linear-size AC0d circuits.
3. For any constant d, there exist constants c, β > 0 such that
MKtP[c logN,N − 1] 6∈ i.o.AC0d(N1+β).
4. For any constants d, k, there exists a constant c > 0 such that
MKtP[c logN,N − 1] 6∈ i.o.AC0d(Nk).
Proof of Theorem 13. Item 1 =⇒ Item 2 follows from Corollary 55. Item 2 =⇒ Item 4
follows from Proposition 54. Item 4 =⇒ Item 3 is obvious. Item 3 =⇒ Item 1 holds because
the truth table of any function in ÃC0(2o(n); 12−2
−o(n)) has Kt complexity less than N−1. J
4.7 Hardness Amplification and MCLPs
The main advantage of studying MCLPs is that hardness amplification can be naturally
regarded as a reduction between two different MCLPs. In this section, we present such
reductions.
Impagliazzo and Wigderson [40] gave a derandomized hardness amplification theorem.
We use the following generalized version of their result.
I Theorem 56 (Derandomized hardness amplification). Let γ > 0 be an arbitrary constant.
There exists a hardness amplification procedure Amp that takes a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
and parameters δ, ε > 0, and returns a Boolean function Ampfε,δ : {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)) → {0, 1}
satisfying the following:
1. If s̃ize(Ampfε,δ; 1/2− ε) ≤ s, then s̃ize(f ; δ) ≤ s · poly(1/ε, 1/δ).
2. For any fixed y ∈ {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)), there exist strings v1, · · · , vk ∈ {0, 1}n for some
k = O(log(1/ε)/δ) such that Ampfε,δ(y) = f(v1)⊕· · ·⊕f(vk). Moreover, if y is distributed
uniformly at random, for each i ∈ [k], vi is distributed uniformly at random.
3. Ampfε,δ(y) can be computed in O(n+ log(1/δ) + log(1/ε)) space, given f, y, ε and δ as an
input.
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Theorem 56 slightly differs from derandomized hardness amplification theorems of [40, 30] in
that we are also interested in the case when the hardness parameter δ is o(1), which is not
required in a standard application of derandomized hardness amplification theorems. We
defer a proof of Theorem 56 to Appendix A.
Using Theorem 56, we give a reduction among different MCLPs.
I Theorem 57. For any constants α, δ > 0, for all sufficiently small β > 0, there exists a
XORO(β logN)-computable reduction from (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ)) to (E vs S̃IZE(2βn; 12 − 2
−βn)).
Proof. The reduction is to simply take the hardness amplification procedure Amp of The-
orem 56. Specifically, given the truth table of a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, the reduction
maps f to the truth table of Ampfε,δ : {0, 1}n
′ → {0, 1}, where ε := 2−βn and n′ = O(n). By
the second item of Theorem 56, each output of the reduction is computable by a XOR of k
bits, where k = O(log(1/ε)/δ) = O(βn).
We claim the correctness of the reduction. Suppose that Kt(f) ≤ O(logN). Then, by
the third item of Theorem 56, we obtain that Kt(Ampfε,δ) ≤ O(logN).
Conversely, suppose that f 6∈ S̃IZE(2αn; δ); that is, s̃ize(f ; δ) > 2αn > 2βn · poly(1/ε, 1/δ),
where the last inequality holds by choosing β > 0 small enough. By the first item of
Theorem 56, we obtain that s̃ize(Ampfε,δ;
1
2 − 2
−βn) > 2βn, which implies that Ampfε,δ 6∈
S̃IZE(2β′n′ ; 12 − 2
−β′n′) for some constant β′ > 0. J
Applying the reduction of Theorem 57 to Corollary 55, we obtain the following.
I Corollary 58. Let d ∈ N, δ > 0 be constants. Suppose that (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ)) 6∈
i.o.AC0d+2(N1+β) for some constants α, β > 0. Then, there exists a hitting set gener-
ator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in time nO(1) and secure against
linear-size AC0d circuits.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Under the assumption that no hitting set generator
is secure against AC0d, it follows from Corollary 55 that (E vs ÃC
0
d+2(2βn; 12 − 2
−βn)) ∈
i.o.AC0d+1(N1+γ) for any constants β, γ > 0. Our goal is to prove that (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ)) ∈
i.o.AC0d+2(N1+η) for any constants α, η > 0.
Fix any constants α, η > 0. By Theorem 57, there exists a XORO(βn)-computable reduction
from (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ)) to (E vs ÃC0d+2(2βn; 12 − 2
−βn)), for all sufficiently small β > 0. The
latter problem can be solved by an AC0d+1(N1+γ). Thus we obtain an AC
0
d+1(N1+γ)◦XORO(βn)
circuit that computes the former problem. Since XORO(βn) can be computed by a depth-2
circuit of size NO(β), by merging one bottom layer of the AC0d+1 circuit, we obtain a circuit
in AC0d+2(N1+γ+O(β)) that computes (E vs S̃IZE(2αn; δ)). The result follows by choosing
β, γ > 0 small enough depending on η > 0. J
Note that AC0 circuits are not capable of computing XOR gates of large fan-in. If a
computational model can compute XOR gates, it is possible to compute a locally-decodable
error-correcting code. Specifically, we provide an efficient reduction from (E vs SIZE(2o(n)))
to (E vs S̃IZE(2o(n); 12 − 2
−o(n))) that is computable by a single layer of XOR gates.
I Theorem 59 (Reductions by Error-Correcting Codes). For any constants α, γ > 0, for
all sufficiently small β > 0, there exists a reduction from (E vs SIZE(2αn)) to (E vs
S̃IZE(2βn; 12 − 2
−βn)) that is computable by one layer of O(N1+γ) XOR gates.
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I Lemma 60 (cf. [63, 69, 73]). For any small constant β > 0, for all large n ∈ N, there
exists an error-correcting code Encf that encodes a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} as a function
Encf : {0, 1}(1+O(
√
β))n → {0, 1} satisfying following:




2. For any fixed y ∈ {0, 1}(1+O(
√
β))n, Encf (y) can be computed by an XOR of some bits of
the truth table of f .
3. Encf can be computed in time 2O(n).
Proof Sketch. We use a Reed-Muller code concatenated with a Hadamard code. The crux
is that the length of a codeword of can be made small because the query complexity of
local-list-decoding algorithms is allowed to be quite large.
Let f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Let Fq be a finite field, where q = 2k for some k. Pick H ⊆ F,
and encode any element of {0, 1}n as an element of Ht by taking an injection η from {0, 1}n
to Ht, where t is some large constant chosen later. Let the size |H| of H be 2n/t. Any
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} can be encoded as a unique low-degree extension f̂ : Ftq → Fq such that
f̂ and f ◦ η agree on Hq. The total degree of f̂ is at most d := t|H| = t2n/t. We will set
q = t2n/t+O(βn).
Then, each alphabet f̂(x) in the Reed-Muller code is encoded with a Hadamard code.
Namely, Encf (x, y) := 〈f̂(x), y〉, where x ∈ Ftq, y ∈ Fk2 and 〈-, -〉 denotes the inner
product function over F2. The length of the truth table of Encf is at most qt+1 =
O(tt+12(n/t+O(βn))(t+1)). By choosing t := 1/
√
β, this is bounded by 2(1+O(
√
β))·n.
Sudan, Trevisan, and Vadhan [63] gave a local list-decoding algorithm for the code
Encf running in time poly(t, q) that can handle a
( 1
2 − (d/q)
Ω(1))-fraction of errors, which
is more than 12 − 2
−βn by choosing q := t2n/t+O(βn) large enough. Given a circuit that
approximates Encf on a 12 − 2
−βn fraction of inputs, one can apply the local list-decoding
algorithm to obtain a circuit that computes f on every input; thus we have size(f) ≤




Proof of Theorem 59. We apply the error-correcting code Enc of Theorem 59. Specifically,
given f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} as input, we map f to Encf : {0, 1}n′ → {0, 1}. Since the length of
tt(Encf ) is 2n′ = N1+O(
√
β) and each bit is computable by a XOR of some bits of tt(f), the
reduction is computable by one layer of O(N1+γ) XOR gates for all sufficiently small β > 0.
We claim the correctness of the reduction. Suppose that Kt(f) = O(logN); then, by the
third item of Lemma 60, we have Kt(Encf ) = O(logN).
Now suppose that f 6∈ SIZE(2αn). By Lemma 60, we have 2αn < size(f) ≤
s̃ize(Encf ; 12 − 2
−βn) · 2O(
√




β))n ≥ 2βn, where the last inequality holds by choosing β > 0 small enough.
Therefore, Encf 6∈ S̃IZE(2β′n′ ; 12 − 2
−β′n′) holds for some constant β′ > 0. J
Applying the reduction, we obtain the following.
I Theorem 61. Let d be a constant. Suppose that (E vs SIZE(2αn)) 6∈ i.o.AC0d+1◦XOR(N1+β)
for some constants α, β > 0. Then, there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn :
{0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N computable in time nO(1) and secure against linear-size AC0d◦XOR
circuits.
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Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Let α, β > 0 be arbitrary constants. Assuming
that no hitting set generator is secure against AC0d ◦ XOR, by Theorem 53, we have (E vs
S̃IZE(2α0n; 12 − 2
−α0n)) ∈ i.o.AC0d+1 ◦ XOR(N1+β0) for any constants α0, β0 > 0. By The-
orem 59, (E vs SIZE(2αn)) is reducible to (E vs S̃IZE(2α0n; 12 − 2
−α0n)) by one layer of
O(N1+γ) XOR gates for any constant γ > 0 and any small enough constant α0 > 0. There-
fore, we obtain a circuit in AC0d+1 ◦XOR◦XOR((N1+γ)1+β0) that computes (E vs SIZE(2αn)).
By merging the bottom two XOR layers, the circuit can be written as an AC0d+1 ◦XOR circuit
of size N1+γ+β0+γβ0 .7 The result follows by choosing positive constants γ, β0  β small
enough. J
We are now ready to complete a proof of Theorem 11, which establishes the equivalence
between the existence of a hitting set generator secure against AC0 ◦XOR and the AC0 ◦XOR
circuit lower bound for the E vs SIZE(2o(n)) problem.
I Restatement of Theorem 11. The following are equivalent.
1. For any constant d, there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) →
{0, 1}n}n∈N computable in time nO(1) and secure against linear-size AC0d ◦ XOR circuits.
2. For any constant d, for some constant β > 0, (E vs SIZE(2o(n))) 6∈ i.o.AC0d(N1+β).
3. For any constant d, for some constant β > 0, MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] 6∈ i.o.AC0d ◦
XOR(N1+β).
4. For any constants d, k ∈ N, MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] 6∈ i.o.AC0d ◦ XOR(Nk).
Proof of Theorem 11. The implications from Item 4 to Item 3 and from Item 3 to Item 2
are trivial. The implication from Item 2 to Item 1 immediately follows from Theorem 61.
The implication from Item 1 to Item 4 is a standard approach for showing a lower bound for
MKtP, and follows from Proposition 54. J
4.8 KS Complexity and Read-Once Branching Program
We now turn our attention to KS complexity. This amounts to considering a hitting set
generator that is computable in a limited amount of space. Applying our proof ideas to the
case of read-once branching programs, we provide a potential approach for resolving RL = L.
I Theorem 62. There exists a universal constant ρ > 0 satisfying the following. Suppose
that, for some constants α, β > 0, (DSPACE(n) vs S̃IZE(2αn; 2−ραn)) cannot be computed by
a read-once co-nondeterministic branching program of size N1+β for all large input length
N ∈ N. Then there exists a hitting set generator G = {Gn : {0, 1}O(logn) → {0, 1}n}n∈N
computable in O(logn) space and secure against linear-size read-once branching programs.
Since the class of read-once branching programs is not closed under taking several
reductions presented so far, we provide a self-contained proof below.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive of Theorem 62 for the universal hitting set generator
HS. Assume that, for every function s(m) = O(logm), there exists a linear-size read-once
branching program D that avoids HSsm for infinitely many m ∈ N. Given arbitrary constants
c, α, β > 0, we will choose a small constant γ > 0, and define s(m) := c′ logm/γ for some
large constant c′. Then using D that avoids HSsm, we present a coRP-type randomized read-
once branching program that solves (ΠYes,ΠNo) := (DSPACE(cn)/ncn vs S̃IZE(2αn; 2−ραn))
on inputs of length N = 2n, for some sufficiently large N := m1/γ . Here, a randomized
branching program means a probability distribution on branching programs.
7 Recall that we count the number of gates except for input gates.
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For simplicity, we first explain a construction of a branching program that may not
be read-once. A randomized branching program D0 is defined as follows. Given an input
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, set ε := 1/4m. Define f̃ := Ampfε,δ : {0, 1}O(logN) → {0, 1}. Let ` denote
the input length of f̃ , and let d = O(`) = O(n) denote the seed length of the Nisan–Wigderson
generator instantiated with `-sized m subsets (Definition 50). Pick z ∼ {0, 1}d and output
¬D(NWf̃ (z)). This is a randomized branching program because for each fixed z, each bit of
NWf̃ (z) is equal to f̃(zS) for some subset S, and hence by Item 2 of Theorem 56 it is some
linear combination of at most k bits of tt(f), which can be computed by a read-once width-2
branching program of size O(k). Thus ¬D(NWf̃ (z)) can be implemented as a branching
program of size O(m · k), by replacing each node of D by the read-once width-2 branching
programs that compute some linear combinations of tt(f).
We claim the correctness of the randomized branching program D0.
B Claim 63.
1. D0 accepts every f ∈ ΠYes with probability 1.
2. For every f ∈ ΠNo, the probability that D0 rejects f is at least 14 .
3. The size of D0 is at most Nβ .
Take any Yes instance f ∈ ΠYes. We observe that the output NWf̃ (z) of the generator has
small KS complexity. Indeed,
KS(NWf̃ (z)) ≤ |z|+ KS(f̃) +O(logN) ≤ KS(f) +O(logN),
where we used Lemma 48 and Item 3 of Theorem 56. In particular, for a large enough
constant c′, we have
KS(f) ≤ c′ logN = s(m),
and thus D(NWf̃ (z)) = 0 by Proposition 35 and the assumption that D avoids HSsm. This
means that the algorithm D0 accepts for every choice of z.
Conversely, suppose that the algorithm D0 accepts some input f with probability at least
3
4 . We claim that f 6∈ ΠNo. The assumption means that Prz[D(NW
f̃ (z)) = 0] ≥ 34 , which
is equivalent to saying that Prz[D(NWf̃ (z)) = 1] ≤ 14 . On the other hand, since D avoids
HSsm, we have Prw[D(w) = 1] ≥ 12 . In particular, we obtain
Pr
w
[D(w) = 1]− Pr
z
[D(NWf̃ (z)) = 1] ≥ 14 .
By the security proof of the Nisan–Wigderson generator (Lemma 51), there exists a one-query
oracle circuit C of size O(m · 2γ`) such that
Pr
y∼{0,1}`
[CD(y) = f̃(y)] ≥ 12 +
1
4m.
Now replacing the oracle gate of C with a circuit that simulates D, we obtain a circuit of size
mO(1) +m ·NO(γ). By the property of Ampε,δ (Item 1 of Theorem 56), we obtain another
circuit C ′ of size mO(1) ·NO(γ) · (1/δ)O(1) such that
Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[C ′(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1− δ.
Choosing δ := N−γ , we obtain that s̃ize(f ;N−γ) ≤ NO(γ), where γ > 0 is an arbitrary small
constant. This completes the proof of the second item of Claim 63, by choosing γ small
enough so that O(γ) < α.
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Recall that the size of D0 is O(m · k). Here k is the parameter from Theorem 56 and
k = O(log(1/ε)/δ) = NO(γ). Thus the size of D0 is at most NO(γ) ≤ Nβ , by choosing γ
small enough so that O(γ) ≤ β. This completes the proof of Claim 63.
Now we modify the construction of D0 in order to obtain a read-once branching program
D1. The branching program D0(NWf̃ (z)) may read some x-th bit of the input tt(f) twice
only if there exists a pair of distinct indices (i, j) such that the ith bit of NWf̃ (z) and the
jth bit of NWf̃ (z) are linear combinations of tt(f) that contain f(x). We say that a coin
flip z is bad if this happens. To ensure that a coin flip is bad with small probability, we
take a pairwise independent generator G2 : {0, 1}O(`) → ({0, 1}`)m, and define a modified
Nisan–Wigderson generator NW′f̃ := f̃m ◦ (ND⊕G2), where ND⊕G2 denotes the function
such that ND⊕G2(u, v) := ND(u)⊕G2(v). Using this modified construction, the read-once
branching program D1 is defined as ¬D(NW′f̃ (z)) if z is not bad, and otherwise defined as
a trivial branching program that outputs 1 always. (Note here that since we deal with a
non-uniform computation, one does not need to check the badness of z by using a branching
program.) By the definition, it is obvious that D1 is read-once; hence it remains to claim
that D1 satisfies the promise of (ΠYes,ΠNo).
As in the case of D0, for f ∈ ΠYes, it can be seen that D(NW′f̃ (z)) = 0 for every z, and
hence D1 always accepts. (We note that the KS complexity increases by an additive term of
the input length of G2, which is O(logN).) Conversely, we claim that if D1 accepts with
probability at least 78 , then f 6∈ ΠNo. Assume that Prz[D1 accepts] ≥
7
8 . We claim that the
probability that z is bad is small: Fix any distinct indices (i, j) ∈ [m]2. Recall that by Item 2
of Theorem 56 for each fixed y ∈ {0, 1}`, there exist inputs vi1, · · · , vik of f such that f̃(y)
can be written as a linear combination of f(vi1), · · · , f(vik), where k = O(log(1/ε)/δ). Fix
any indices i′, j′ ∈ [k]. Then the probability that vii′ = v
j
j′ is at most 1/N because of the
pairwise independence of G2 and each vii′ is uniformly distributed. By the union bound, the
probability that z is bad is bounded above by (km)2 · 1/N ≤ NO(γ)−1 ≤ 18 , for a sufficiently
small γ > 0 and a large N ∈ N. Thus we obtain
Pr
z
[D(NW′f̃ (z)) = 0] ≥ Pr[D1 accepts]− Pr[z is bad] ≥
3
4 .
The rest of a proof of the correctness is essentially the same with the case of D0, observing
that the security proof of the Nisan–Wigderson generator also works for the modified version
NW′.
Finally, we convert the randomized read-once branching program D1 of size Nβ into a
co-nondeterministic read-once branching program of size N1+β . This can be done by using
the standard Adleman’s trick [1]: Specifically, the success probability of D1 can be amplified
to 1− 2−N by taking AND of O(N) independent copies of D1. By the union bound, there
exists a good coin flip sequence such that AND of O(N) copies of D1 solves (ΠYes,ΠNo) on
every input of length N . Hard-wiring such a coin flip sequence and simulating the AND
gate by using a co-nondeterministic computation, we obtain a co-nondeterministic read-once
branching program of size O(N1+β). J
5 Non-trivial Derandomization and MKtP
In this section, we provide a characterization of non-trivial derandomization for uniform
algorithms by a lower bound for MKtP. We start with a formal definition of non-trivial
derandomization for uniform algorithms.
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IDefinition 64 (Non-trivial derandomization). An algorithm A is said to be a derandomization
algorithm for DTIME(t(n)) that runs in time s(n) if the following hold. The algorithm takes
1n and a description of a machine M and outputs an n-bit string A(1n,M) ∈ {0, 1}n in
time s(n). For any machine M running in time t(n) on inputs of length n ∈ N, there exist
infinitely many n ∈ N such that, if Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x) = 1] ≥ 12 , then M(A(1
n,M)) = 1.
In the following, for a function s : N → N, we denote by RsKt the set {x ∈ {0, 1}∗ |
Kt(x) ≥ s(|x|) } of Kt-random strings with threshold s. We say that a set R ⊆ {0, 1}∗ is
dense if Prx∼{0,1}n [x ∈ R] ≥ 12 for all large n ∈ N.
I Proposition 65. The following are equivalent for any time-constructible functions t, s such
that t(n), s(n) ≥ n.
1. There exists a derandomization algorithm for DTIME(t(n)) that runs in time
2s(n)+O(log t(n)).
2. Any dense subset of Rs(n)+O(log t(n))Kt cannot be accepted by any t(n)-time algorithm.
Proof. (Item 1 =⇒ Item 2) Let A be a derandomization algorithm for DTIME(t(n)). Since
A runs in time 2s(n)+O(log t(n)) on input (1n,M), the Kt-complexity of A(1n,M) is at most
s(n) +O(log t(n)) + |M |.
Let M be any t(n)-time algorithm such that Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x) = 1] ≥ 12 for all large
n ∈ N. By the property of A, we have M(A(1n,M)) = 1 for infinitely many n. This means
that M accepts the string A(1n,M) that has Kt-complexity at most s(n) + O(log t(n));
therefore, M does not accept a dense subset of Kt-random strings.
(Item 2 =⇒ Item 1) Let A be the algorithm that takes (1n,M), enumerates all the
strings x whose Kt-complexity is at most s(n) + O(log t(n)), and, for each string x with
small Kt-complexity, simulates M on input x; if M accepts x in time t(n), output x and
halt. The running time of A is clearly at most 2s(n)+O(log t(n)). To prove the correctness,
assume towards a contradiction that some algorithm M runs in time t(n) and for all large n,
Prx∼{0,1}n [M(x) = 1] ≥ 12 andM(A(1
n,M)) = 0. The latter condition means that A cannot
find a string x that is accepted by M ; thus, M rejects all the strings x whose Kt-complexity
is at most s(n) + O(log t(n)). Therefore, M accepts a dense subset of Kt-random strings,
which is a contradiction. J
I Theorem 66. Let t, s : N→ N be time-constructible functions such that t is non-decreasing
and ω(log2 n) ≤ s(n) ≤ n and poly(n) ≤ t(n) for all large n, where poly is some universal
polynomial.
For any constant c > 0, there exists a constant c′ such that, if there is a t(n)-time
algorithm that accepts a dense subset of Rn−c
√
n logn
Kt , then the following promise problem can
be solved in DTIME(O(t(2s(n)) · 2
√
s(n) logn)) ∩ coRTIME(O(t(2s(n)))).
Yes: strings x such that Kt(x) ≤ s, where s := s(|x|).
No: strings x such that Kt′(x) > s+ c′
√
s logn, where s := s(|x|) and t′ = t(2s) · poly(|x|).
I Lemma 67 (cf. [31]). For any d,m ≤ n, ε > 0, there exists a black-box pseudorandom
generator construction Gx : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m that takes a string x ∈ {0, 1}n and satisfies the
following.
1. For any ε-distinguisher T : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} for Gx, it holds that
Kt,T (x) ≤ exp(`2/d) ·m+ d+O(log(n/ε)),
where ` = O(logn) and t = poly(n, 1/ε).
2. Gx(z) is computable in time poly(n, 1/ε).
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Proof Sketch. The pseudorandom generator construction Gx is defined as Gx(z) :=
NWEnc(x)(z) for any z ∈ {0, 1}d, where NW is the Nisan–Wigderson generator [53] that is
instantiated with the weak design of [58] and the function whose truth table is Enc(x) as a
candidate hard function. J
Proof of Theorem 66. Fix n ∈ N and an input x ∈ {0, 1}n. For simplicity, let s := s(n).
Define d :=
√
s logn. Since s(n) = ω(log2 n), we have 4cd ≤ s for a sufficiently large n.






We claim that there exists a coRP-type algorithm A that uses d random bits and solves
the promise problem. The algorithm A operates as follows. Pick a random seed z ∈ {0, 1}d,
and accept if and only if D(Gx(z)) = 0, where the output length of Gx is set to be m. This
runs in time t(m) + poly(n) ≤ O(t(2s)) and can be derandomized in time O(t(2s)) · 2d by
exhaustively trying all the random bits.
It remains to prove the correctness of the algorithm A. Assume that Kt(x) ≤ s. Then,
since Gx(z) is computable in polynomial time, for any z ∈ {0, 1}d, we have
Kt(Gx(z)) ≤ d+ s+O(logn) ≤ s+ 2d ≤ s+ 4cd− 2cd < m− c
√
m logn,








Kt , which is rejected by D; hence, A accepts.
Conversely, assume that the probability that A accepts is at least 34 . This means that
Pr
z∼{0,1}d




[D(w) = 0] ≤ 12 ,




(x) ≤ exp(`2/d) ·m+O(logn)




which can be bounded above by s+ c′
√
s logn by choosing a large enough constant c′. Thus,
x is not a No instance of the promise problem. Taking the contrapositive, we conclude that
any No instance x is rejected by A with probability at least 14 . J
In the special case when t(n) = nO(1), Theorem 66 implies that the Kt vs Kt problem
can be solved in coRP.
Proof Sketch of Theorem 15. We claim that the Kt vs Kt problem can be solved in coRP
under the assumption that MKtP ∈ P. We use the same proof of Theorem 66 for t(n) = nO(1)
when the parameter s = ω(log2 n); when s = O(log2 n), we set d := `2 and m := O(d)
as in [31]. J
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I Restatement of Theorem 14. For any constant 0 < ε < 1, the following are equivalent.
1. For some c1, for any large c2, there exists no derandomization algorithm for
DTIME(2c1
√
n logn) that runs in time 2n−c2
√
n logn.
2. For some c1, for any large c2, there exists an algorithm running in time 2c1
√
n logn that




3. For some c1, for any large c2, MKtP[n− c2
√
n logn, n− 1] ∈ DTIME(2c1
√
n logn).
4. For some c1, for any large c2, MKtP[nε, nε + c2
√
nε logn] ∈ DTIME(2c1
√
nε logn).
Proof. (Item 1 ⇐⇒ Item 2) This equivalence follows from Proposition 65.
(Item 2 =⇒ Item 4) We apply Theorem 66 for t(n) := 2c1
√
n logn and s(n) := nε.
Then we obtain a DTIME(O(t(2s)) · 2
√
s logn)-algorithm A that distinguishes Yes instances
x such that Kt(x) ≤ s from No instances x such that Kt′(x) > s + c′2
√
s logn, where
t′ = t(2s) · poly(n) and c′2 is some constant. We choose a constant c′1 large enough so that
O(t(2s)) ·2
√
s logn ≤ 2c′1
√
s logn, which bounds from above the running time of the algorithm A.
We claim that MKtP[s, s+ c′′2
√
s logn] is also solved by A for any sufficiently large c′′2 .
Take any string x such that Kt(x) ≥ s + c′′2
√
s logn. Since Kt(x) ≤ Kt′(x) + O(log t′) ≤
Kt′(x)+O(c1
√




s logn) > s+c′2
√
s logn,
where the last inequality holds for any sufficiently large c′′2 ; thus, x is rejected by A.
(Item 4 =⇒ Item 3) By the assumption, there exists a constant c1 such that, for
all large c2, there exists an algorithm A that solves MKtP[nε, nε + c2
√
nε logn] in time
2c1
√
nε logn. Define c′1 := c1/ε. For all large c′2, we construct an algorithm B that solves
MKtP[n− c′2
√
n logn, n− 1] in time 2c′1
√
n logn. The algorithm B takes an input x of length
n and simulates A on input x10m−n−1 for m := (n− 2c2
√
n logn)1/ε. The running time of
B is at most 2c1
√
m logm ≤ 2c1/ε·
√
m logn = 2c′1
√
m logn.
It remains to prove the correctness of B. Take any x ∈ {0, 1}n such that Kt(x) ≤
n − c′2
√
n logn. Then we have Kt(x10m−n−1) ≤ n − c′2
√
n logn + O(logn) ≤ mε for any
large c2; thus B accepts x. Conversely, take any x such that Kt(x) ≥ n− 1. Then we have
Kt(x10m−n−1) ≥ n−O(logn) = mε + 2c2
√
n logn−O(logn) ≥ mε + c2
√
mε logn; thus, B
rejects.
(Item 3 =⇒ Item 2) This immediately follows from the fact that the complement of
MKtP[n− c2
√
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A Derandomized Hardness Amplification Theorem
We review a simplified proof of derandomized hardness amplification given by Healy, Vadhan
and Viola [30], and observe that the parameter shown in Theorem 56 can be achieved by
slightly modifying the construction.
ITheorem 56 (Derandomized hardness amplification). Let γ > 0 be an arbitrary constant.
There exists a hardness amplification procedure Amp that takes a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}
and parameters δ, ε > 0, and returns a Boolean function Ampfε,δ : {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)) → {0, 1}
satisfying the following:
1. If s̃ize(Ampfε,δ; 1/2− ε) ≤ s, then s̃ize(f ; δ) ≤ s · poly(1/ε, 1/δ).
2. For any fixed y ∈ {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)), there exist strings v1, · · · , vk ∈ {0, 1}n for some
k = O(log(1/ε)/δ) such that Ampfε,δ(y) = f(v1)⊕· · ·⊕f(vk). Moreover, if y is distributed
uniformly at random, for each i ∈ [k], vi is distributed uniformly at random.
3. Ampfε,δ(y) can be computed in O(n+ log(1/δ) + log(1/ε)) space, given f, y, ε and δ as an
input.
First, we explain the construction of our hardness amplification procedure. The construc-
tion is a XOR of the nearly disjoint generator ND and a hitter Hit (cf. [24]). In fact, we need
a slightly generalized version of a hitter, for which we show that the same construction of [24]
suffices. We note that in the previous works [40, 30], an expander walk was used instead of
Hit; this does not give us a nearly optimal construction of a hitter when δ is not a constant.
I Lemma 68. There exists a “hitter” Hit such that, given parameters n ∈ N, ε, δ > 0, a
function Hitn,ε,δ : {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)) → ({0, 1}n)kn,ε,δ takes a seed of length O(n+ log(1/ε))
and outputs a list L of kn,ε,δ = O(log(1/ε)/δ) strings of length n such that, for any subsets
H1, · · · , Hkn,ε,δ ⊆ {0, 1}n of size ≥ δ2n, with probability at least 1− ε, there exists an index
i ∈ [kn,ε,δ] such that the ith string in the list L is in Hi. Moreover, KS(L) ≤ O(n+ log(1/ε)).
Proof Sketch. We observe that the construction of [24, Appendix C] satisfies the requirement
of Lemma 68. The construction is as follows: First, we take a pairwise independent generator
G2 : {0, 1}O(n) → ({0, 1}n)O(1/δ). By Chebyshev’s inequality, with probability at least 12 over
the choice of a seed r ∈ {0, 1}O(n), G2 hits some Hi, · · · , Hi+O(1/δ), where i is an arbitrary
index. Now we take an explicit construction of a constant-degree expander on 2O(n) vertices,
and generate a random walk v1, · · · , v` of length ` = O(log(1/ε)) over {0, 1}O(n), which takes
random bits of length O(n+ log(1/ε)). The output of Hit is defined as the concatenation of
G2(v1), · · · , G2(v`). The correctness follows by using the Expander Random Walk Theorem
[24, Theorem A.4]. J
I Definition 69. Let f be a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, and ε, δ > 0 be arbitrary para-
meters. Let k := kn,ε,δ. Let ND: {0, 1}O(n) → ({0, 1}n)k be the nearly disjoint generator
(Definition 49) defined with the design of Lemma 48. We define a generator
IWn,ε,δ : {0, 1}O(n+log(1/ε)) → ({0, 1}n)k
as
IWn,ε,δ(x, y) := ND(x)⊕Hit(y).
Then we define a hardness amplified version
Ampfε,δ : {0, 1}
O(n+log(1/ε)) → {0, 1}
of f as the function Ampfε,δ := f⊕k ◦ IWn,ε,δ.
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We proceed to a proof of Theorem 56. Recall several notions from [30]. For a subset
H ⊆ {0, 1}n (which is supposed to be a hard-core set) and a function f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1},
we consider a probabilistic function fH : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}, i.e., a distribution over a Boolean
function, defined as follows: For each x ∈ H, the value fH(x) is defined as a random bit
chosen uniformly at random and independently; For each x ∈ {0, 1}n \H, the value fH(x) is
defined as f(x). Assuming that H is indeed a hard-core set for f , the distributions (x, f(x))
and (x, fH(x)) where x ∼ {0, 1}n are computationally indistinguishable. Indeed:
I Proposition 70 (cf. [65]). Let H ⊆ {0, 1}n be an arbitrary subset, f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} be
an arbitrary function, and ε > 0 be an arbitrary parameter. If
Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[A(x, f(x)) = 1]− Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[A(x, fH(x)) = 1] ≥ ε,












where Bias(h(x)) is defined as |Prh[h(x) = 0]− Prh[h(x) = 1]|. It was shown in [30] that the
hardness of f⊕k ◦G(z) is essentially characterized by the expected bias of ExpBias[f⊕kH ◦ IW],
using a property of the nearly disjoint generator ND.
I Lemma 71 ([30, Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.12]). Let g be an arbitrary probabilistic function,
and ε > 0 be arbitrary parameters. Suppose that there exists a function A such that
Pr
z
[A(z) = f⊕k ◦ IW(z)] ≥ 12 +
1
2ExpBias[g
⊕k ◦ IW] + ε2
Then there exists a one-query oracle circuit C of size O(k · 2γn) such that
E
x
[CA(x, f(x))− CA(x, g(x))] ≥ ε2k ,
where γ > 0 is an arbitrary constant of Lemma 48.
We will apply Lemma 71 for g := fH . By using a property of the hitter, we show that
the expected bias of fH is small whenever a hard-core set H is large enough.
I Lemma 72. Let ε, δ > 0 be arbitrary parameters, and H ⊆ {0, 1}n be a subset of size at
least δ2n. Let k := kn,ε,δ. Then ExpBias[f⊕kH ◦ IWn,ε,δ] ≤ ε
Proof. The idea is that when a hitter hits a hard-core set H, the expected bias becomes
0. More specifically, recall that IW(x, y) is defined as ND(x)⊕Hitn,ε,δ(y). Fix any x, and
define Hi as a shifted version of H: namely, Hi := ND(x)i ⊕H := {ND(x)i ⊕ h | h ∈ H }
for every i ∈ [k]. We apply Lemma 68 for H1, · · · , Hk. Since |Hi| = |H| ≥ δ2n for
every i ∈ [k], by the property of the hitter, there exists some index i ∈ [k] such that
Hitn,ε,δ(y)i ∈ Hi = ND(x)i ⊕H with probability at least 1− ε over the choice of y. In this










[ IWn,ε,δ(x, y)i 6∈ H for every i ∈ [k] ] ≤ ε J
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Now we combine Proposition 70 and Lemmas 71 and 72 and obtain the following:
I Corollary 73. Let n ∈ N and ε, δ > 0. Let H ⊆ {0, 1}n be an arbitrary subset of size at
least δ2n. If some function A satisfies
Pr
z
[A(z) = f⊕k ◦ IWn,ε,δ(z)] ≥
1
2 + ε
then there exists a one-query oracle circuit C of size O(k · 2γn) such that,
Pr
x∼H
[CA(x) = f(x)] ≥ 12 +
ε
2δk .
At this point, we make use of Impagliazzo’s hard-core lemma [37]. Equivalently, one can
view it as a boosting algorithm (cf. [43]).
I Lemma 74 (cf. [37, 43]). Under the condition of Corollary 73, there exists an oracle circuit
C of size O(k · 2γn) · poly(k/ε) such that
Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[CA(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1− δ.
Now we take any circuit A of size s such that
Pr
z
[A(z) = Ampfε,δ(z)] ≥
1
2 + ε.
By using Corollary 73 and Lemma 74 and replacing each oracle gate by a circuit A, we obtain
a circuit C of size O(k · 2γn) · poly(k/ε) · s such that
Pr
x∼{0,1}n
[C(x) = f(x)] ≥ 1− δ.
This completes the proof of Theorem 56.
B AC0 Lower Bounds for MKtP
In this section, we prove that there exists no constant-depth fixed-polynomial-size circuit that
computes MKtP[O(logN), No(1)] (Proposition 12). Previously, [14] used the pseudorandom
restriction of Trevisan and Xue [67] to obtain AC0 lower bounds for MKtP[polylogN ]. Here
we make use of a polynomial-time-computable pseudorandom restriction that shrinks AC0
circuits, which enables us to prove a lower bound for MKtP[O(logN)]. The following lemma
is proved in the context of quantified derandomization.
I Lemma 75 (Goldreich and Wigderson [27]). For any constants α < 1 and d ∈ N and
any polynomials p, q, there exists a constant k and a polynomial-time algorithm of O(logn)
randomness complexity that produces restrictions on n variables such that the following
conditions hold:
1. The number of undetermined variables in each restriction is at least 2nα.
2. For any n-input circuit of depth d and size at most p(n), with probability at least 1−1/q(n),
the corresponding restricted circuit depends on at most k variables.
Proof of Proposition 12. Fix any polynomial p and a depth d. We claim that, for some
constant c > 0, there exists no depth-d circuit of size p(n) that computes MKtP[c logn, nα]
for all large n. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there exists a depth-d circuit C of size
p(n) that computes MKtP[c logn, nα]. We use Lemma 75 for q ≡ 2. Then, there exists a
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polynomial-time algorithm that produces a pseudorandom restriction ρ that shrinks C to a
circuit of size k = O(1) with probability at least 12 . Fix one pseudorandom restriction ρ such
that the restricted circuit Cρ is a constant-size circuit.
We claim that C does not compute MKtP[c logn, nα]. Let σ be the restriction that fixes
k variables on which Cρ depend to 0. Consider 0n ◦ρ = 0n ◦σ ◦ρ, i.e., the string obtained by
fixing undetermined variables in ρ to 0. Since ρ is generated by a polynomial-time algorithm,
there exists a constant c such that Kt(0n ◦ ρ) ≤ c logn. Thus, 0n ◦ σ ◦ ρ is a Yes instance of
MKtP[c logn, nα]. Since Cσ◦ρ is a constant circuit, we have 1 = Cσ◦ρ(0n) = Cσ◦ρ(x) for
any x ∈ {0, 1}n. However, for a random x ∈ {0, 1}n, by a simple counting argument, it holds
that Kt(x ◦ σ ◦ ρ) ≥ 2nα − k − 1 > nα with high probability. Therefore, x ◦ σ ◦ ρ is a No
instance of MKtP[c logn, nα] for some x, which is a contradiction. J
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